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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 
Teachers and curriculum planners have long been aware 
that literature can play an important part in moral education, 
although it does not appear that its actual contribution has 
been very thoroughly articulated in recent years . It is 
important that this should be done, since the rethinking which 
has occurred regarding moral education and literary and 
aesthetic theories has made the traditional assumptions some-
what obsolete . It is clear that one very important feature of 
what John Wilson calls a "liberal" moral education is that 
students must learn how to find out what other people are 
feeling or might feel. This thesis will consider the ways in 
which we can know how other people feel, and the role which 
literature might play in the development of the necessary 
ability. 
There tends to be some confusion about the role of know-
ledge of the feelings of others in moral education, not because 
anyone doubts its importance, but rather because words with 
very different meanings are often used loosely. Words such as 
"empathise" and "sympathise" seem to be freely exchanged with 
others such as "imagine" and "identify". The problem here is 
one of confusing "feeling" with "knowing" . One of the 
purposes of this introduction is to distinguish between these 
two concepts as they contribute to a rational morality. 
While moral issues are not restricted to those issues 
concerning how we ought to behave toward other people, it is 
true nevertheless that those who wish to unravel the elements 
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required for a moral education must give considerable attention 
to the implications of the principle of "concern for other 
people's interests". We often have difficulties when we try 
to guide our behaviour by this principle, however, because we 
so frequently lack sufficient facts to make confident moral 
judgements. We must know whose interests will be affected by 
a situation and how they will be affected, and we must know the 
effects on such interests of any actions we might take. A 
person's interests may be determined by what is dangerous to 
him (if he is perhaps too young to judge, or insufficiently 
knowledgeable in the use of machinery ) or they may be determined 
by what we see as counting as infringements of what we more 
generally consider to be his human rights (to decide for 
himself, or to receive equal treatment ) . But very often a 
consideration of the interests of others involves consideration 
of their feelings. "All things being equal" we don't wish to 
torment or upset people, and are concerned that they feel happy 
and satisfied. We don't sacrifice one person's safety for 
another person's peace of mind, but we also endeavour to avoid 
making one person happy at the expense of the happiness of 
another. And although concern for a person's feelings seems 
relatively unimportant next to a concern for life itself, we 
know that extremes of feeling, such as towering rages or depths 
of despair, deprive people of their rationality and hence are 
not only undesirable in themselves but can also be extremely 
dangerous through removing from them their ability to judge 
their own best interests. Knowing how other people feel is 
often essential to deciding their interests and it must be a 
major concern of the moral educator, since day - to - day moral 
& 
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issues are much more concerned with the feelings of people than 
they are with matters of life and death. Once this is acknow-
ledged it is easy to see the force of Ehman's claim that our 
disputes over moral matters are much more frequently clashes 
over the nature of the facts of the situation and how they 
should be interpreted than they are over matters of value and 
. . 1 1 prlnclp e. For knowing how people feel or will feel in a 
particular case is a task of formidable difficulty. 
John Wilson divides his description of a rational morality 
into what he calls "first-order moral principles" such as 
"other people's interests", and "second- order norms and rules 
of procedure: things like self- awareness, facing facts, 
developing imagination". _ These things he breaks down into a 
set of moral components, two of which deserve our particular 
attention, since they are linked psychologically if not 
logically in a rational morality and their content is liable to 
be confused. 
{a } PHIL refers to the degree to which one can identify 
with other people, in the sense of being such that 
other people's feelings and interests actually count or 
weigh with one, or are accepted as of equal validity to 
one's own. Different PHIL ratings might refer to the 
degree to which people are able to identify, and also to 
the range of this ability. Thus some people may identify 
very highly with, say, other gang- members, and not at all 
with old ladies: other people may identify very poorly 
with those of another class or colour, and so forth. 
{The degree with which one ought to identify in particular 
situations is of course in question here: but the 
principle is that one ought to identify sufficiently to 
think and act in such a way as always to take their 
interests into account, regarding them as on an equality 
with oneself.} Like the other components, this is a 
matter of whether, in principle, one accepts others as 
equals: not a matter of how far one loves them, feels 
for them, etc. . 
lEhman, R., "Moral Objectivity", Journal of Philosophical and 
Phenomenological Research, vol. XXVIII, 1967. Page 181 . 
» 
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(b) EMP refers to awareness o r insight into one's own 
and other people's feelings : i . e . , the ability to 
know what those feelings are and describe them correctly . 
A distinction might be drawn between self- awareness 
(AUTEMP) and awareness of others (JI"LLEMP ) . EMP does not 
of course logically imply PHIL, though as a matter of 
psychological fact it may be that one cannot develop in 
such a way as to have much EMP without regarding them as 
equals: but how many such cases exist in practice is a 
matter for further research. _0- Awareness of feelings 
is logically connected with a person's ability to state 
correctly what so- and- so feels, and to predict what he 
would feel, in certain situations. 2 
Such a useful account as Wilson's can serve to establish 
a "launching pad" for the investigations being undertaken here. 
Yet some consideration must be given to a problem which often 
arises when a passage such as this is considered, and this is a 
puzzle over the contribution of "feeling" to our awareness of 
others. We need to reaff-irm the logical "purity" of the 
notion of "knowing how other people feel" from certain notions 
of feeling with respect to others. Knowing how another person 
feels does not logically entail that we feel anything with them 
or toward them. Whether we can develop the abilities necessary 
for such knowing without in fact feeling "for" or "with" other 
people at some point in certain developmental sequences is 
another question - one which may be to do with empirical rather 
than logical matters. Nevertheless, there are some concepts 
which are akin to "knowing how other people feel" which do 
require some form of emotional response. One of the diffi -
culties is that certain phrases are treated by some people as 
though they are synonymous, and as a consequence "feeling" slips 
in and out of our debates on these topics in a manner which 
becomes apparent (and confusing ) when we try to decide what 
2Wilson, J., Williams, N. and Sugarman, B., 
Moral Education, Farmington Trust, 1967. 
192, 195. 
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ought to be done in our day - to- day decisions about moral educa-
tion of children. People speak of "knowing how other people 
feel", "understanding the feelings of others", "being aware of 
the feelings of others", "putting ourselves in other people's 
'shoes''', or of "sympathising" or "empathising" with them . 
It should be obvious that the first three of these do not 
logically require feelings of any sort, and that the last two 
do - they are responses. The fourth one - "putting oneself in 
another person's 'place' or his 'shoes'" is ambiguous on its 
own. In the first place it is not to be taken literally -
that would be logically impossible. It could mean "try and 
feel the sorts of things he must be feeling" or it could mean 
"try and think out what it would be like (work out the psycho-
logical facts of ) being in his position". 
Some writers, when talking of elements of morality akin 
to Wilson's EMP, employ the "feeling" concepts. Hare, for 
example, speaks of "sympathetic imagination".3 Wilson has, 
of course, unintentionally encouraged this sort of interpre-
tat ion of his own concept through the similarity of the term 
EMP to "empathy" , although he has been at pains to point out 
that it does not mean "sympathy" or any feeling or attitude. 4 
But the confusion will continue, not merely because people are 
often unaware of the logical implications of their language, 
but also because the place of feeling in these second- order 
norms and rules of procedure is insufficiently clear. There 
do seem to be two kinds of contribution which "feelings" are 
3 . Hare, R.M., Freedom and Reason, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1963. Page 94. 
4Wilson, J., Moral Thinking, Farmington Trust, 1970 . Heine-
mann. Page 54. 
> 
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frequently assumed to make (aside from the more legitimate 
developmental ones). Firstly, feeling "for" or "with" other 
people may be ne~essary to our "concern" for others - that 
perception that we are involved with the trials and tribulations 
of other people. Secondly, some people seem to feel that one 
or both of these types of feeling may be logically necessary 
to our "really" understanding how other people feel. When we 
"fully understand" how another person feels we perhaps achieve 
some sort of emotional participation in their experience. 
The matter of "concern" is to be found in PHIL - "other 
people's feelings and interests actually count or weigh with 
one, or are accepted as of equal validity to one's own" . This 
is "the degree to which one can identify with other people", 
but it is "not a matter of how far one loves them, feels for 
them, etc." It is a matter of principle. Nevertheless, 
Wilson's use of "identification" has been taken by some of us 
as suggesting that "feeling with" might be involved. 5 It 
seems at first sight to be a concept similar to "sympathy" and 
"empathy" and this possibility deserves closer investigation. 
If we hear that the teaching profession is being unjustly 
attacked in respect of an issue with which we, as ex- teachers, 
are familiar, we may feel angry because we identify with the 
teachers. There is a conceptual connection between our anger 
and our identification in this instance, but to "identify" is 
not always to "feel". When we identify with teachers, younger 
brothers or trout fishermen, we assign ourselves to particular 
social groups. When we say that we identify ourselves with 
5Gribble, J. and Oliver, R., "Empathy and Education". 
Unpublished paper, Universities of Melbourne and Canterbury, 
1971. Page 15. 
> ---- - -- ------------------------------
fishermen we are pointing out that we have been through 
experiences which fishermen characteristically go through: 
that we believe what fishermen usually believe; value what 
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they value. We know how fishermen tend to think and think in 
much the same way ourselves. (This need not be the same as 
identifying ourselves as fishermen, which means that our 
behaviour fulfils certain criteria which define the act of 
fishing. Of course, in some definitions these two things come 
together - some might say that doctors, to be doctors, must be 
committed to the Hypocratic oath). The fact that we who 
identify with fishermen may feel "for" or "with" the man whose 
line is tangled in the trees is not very surprising since by 
identifying with him we have met some minimal condition of each 
o f these forms of feeling. A person who knows how a fisherman 
feels will recognise that he is in a frustrating position. The 
other person must be seen to be in some sort of plight before 
"sympathy" is possible. If we know how he feels we have also 
met a necessary condition of "empathy".6 "Identifying" is not 
a response, although it may dispose us to certain responses. 
Thus, when we say that we feel angry because we identify with 
teachers, we are pointing to a fact, the necessary consequence 
of which (under certain other conditions) is our anger. 
The use of "identify" which is analysed here seems to be 
the sense in which Wilson employs the term. Thus, "some people 
may identify very highly with, say, other gang-members, and 
not at all with old ladies: other people may identify very 
poorly with those of another class or colour, and so forth". 
For PHIL, it is essential that "other people's interests 
Page 5. 
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actually count or weigh with one or are accepted as of equal 
validity to one's own" . This is a matter of principle, a 
cornerstone of a rational morality and essential to a "concern 
for other people's interests" in such a morality. Elsewhere 
Wilson notes that "in making moral judgements, we consider 
other people as being on an equal footing with ourselves : what 
goes for us goes for them too, and vice versa. Without this, 
it is suggested, the whole business of morality and interper-
7 
sonal rules could not get started." Now without considering 
the obviously difficult question of what it is to treat the 
interests of people "equally", it is plain that we must care as 
much for those people whose feelings and interests we don't 
understand as we do for those whose feelings and interests are 
quite clear to us. We may identify more readily with gang-
members than with old ladies, but this does not mean that, 
because we do not share the beliefs of old ladies or have the 
same interests as they do, we can permit these interests, 
beliefs or feelings to weigh less with us than do those of gang-
members. Wilson seems to suggest that the thing to do is to 
learn to identify with more people, but this is to mix up a 
principle with a capacity. It would be unreasonable to suggest 
that we should attempt to identify with all people in respect of 
all interests. Perhaps we can identify with any man over 
certain "universal" feelings and interests - the desire for food 
and shelter or sexual gratification - but we cannot expect the 
gang- member to identify with old ladies in respect of those 
beliefs and interests which are confined to old ladies as a 
7Wilson, J., Williams, N. and Sugarman, B., Introduction to 
Moral Education. Page 77. 
9 
group. Identification is, after all, the capacity to recognise 
that certain beliefs and interests of ours are shared by other 
people - it is not merely that the feelings and interests of 
others are understood. A rational man will surely be unable 
to identify with the hospital patient's fear that he is being 
devoured by giant spiders, but he may still need to consider 
the feelings and interests of such a man. It can be seen, 
then, that this PHIL component is quite distinct from EMP, 
which is concerned with knowing how others feel. PHIL is the 
principle which leads us to embark on the search for the 
interests of the other: when we " identify" this search is 
partly complete. 
It may be necessary, however, for us to identify with 
others before this principle can be developed. For us to 
establish a general principle that "other people's feelings and 
int~rests actually count or weigh with (us ) , or are accepted as 
of equal validity to (our ) own", we must first have reached the 
position of having recognised that at least some specifiable 
people have the same interests and feelings that we have and 
that we, as equal members of this class of people, have no 
special rights by virtue of our membership where these feelings 
and interests are concerned. The development of this capacity 
to identify with o thers may in turn depend upon the assignment 
of a special status to the human object - the acquisition of the 
concept of a "person " - and even at some point upon the ability 
to feel "with" or " for" other people. But these are psycho-
logical matters somewhat independent of the nature of the 
principle itself. 
Of course, although our consideration of the contribution 
f 
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of feelings to PHIL must be confined to the sorts o f matters 
considered above, a full analysis could not end there . The 
principle involves some sort of caring - people's feelings and 
interests must IIcount ll or IIweighll with one. This caring is a 
matter of principle and as such is not unlike IIcaringll for 
truth or adequate evidence - rational passions which are not 
directly called out between particular individuals as are 
feelings IIfor ll or feelings IIwith ll • They are matters of 
principle which are held autonomously in a developed rationality. 
The second possible contribution of feelings to components 
of this sort might arise from a common assumption that we do 
not IIreallyll know how another feels unless we feel something 
somewhat akin to what is being felt by the other person. 
IIEmpathy" is seen as occasioning some special form of knowledge, 
although it is always unclear what this might be. In practice, 
of course, it is rather interesting that when we approach a 
person who claims to empathise or sympathise we are tolerant of 
a considerable latitude in respect of the kinds of things which 
he might be feeling, but we do tend to show some concern over 
whatever knowledge claims are involved. If a friend says that 
he sympathises with another person's plight or his anguish it 
is true that we do not deny that he feels sympathy if we 
discover that the other person is not in a plight or anguished, 
but we consider the sympathy mistaken or foolish. If our 
friend claims to empathise with another's anger and we find 
that the person is angry, but in respect of an event of which 
our friend has no knowledge whatever, we will reject the claim 
to empathise. We do not demand that, for A to empathise with 
B he must sweat if B sweats or blush if B blushes. We merely 
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require him to feel something "somewhat akin" to what B is 
feeling, and considerable latitude is allowed. A wide range 
of feelings seem to corne under the very general notion of 
"sympathy" - "sorrow", "compassion", "pity" or "concern" all 
seem acceptable. We look askance at someone who is unmoved 
by the trials of another and see this as symptomatic of either 
a failure to care about the feelings of this person (he is 
callous ) or of a failure to possess sufficient facts about the 
state of the feelings of the other. We do not believe that 
his failure to be moved results in a lack of knowledge but 
rather the reverse (given that he holds PHIL ) . 
When people claim that "we do not really understand how 
they feel" they often mean that our behaviour would be different 
if we did. Sometimes it is suggested that "if we had ever 
experienced it we would really know". The "feeling" idea 
might enter when people consider such things, since when we 
recall horrible, frustrating or embarrassing experiences our 
horror, frustration or embarrassment sometimes returns. But 
it is clear that possession of these feelings does not contri-
bute to our knowledge of the other person's experience (except 
in so far as they serve to remind us of what we once felt ) and 
the intrusion of the ideas of feeling "with" and feeling "for" 
can only serve to blind us to the important contribution of 
particular experiences to really understanding. Feelings which 
we do have are important, of course, for we can only know what 
another person feels in terms of an analogy with something we 
have felt ourselves at sometime or other. But when we attempt 
to know what another person is feeling in a particular instance 
we do not necessarily need to feel anything in order to be 
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successful. 
Our conceptions of feelings are limited by our experiences 
of feeling. A person who has never "known fear" may be able 
to give a factual account of the types of observable behaviour 
shown by those who are said to fear, and he may be able to 
indicate, as a consequence of what others have told him, the 
sensations of people who are in the grip of fear - those 
sensations which he has experienced in other contexts. But he 
will not know what it means to value things in such a way that 
fear will result when the valued things are threatened. 
Similarly, there are certain sensations which are too far 
divorced from any we have experienced to enable us to employ any 
sort of analogy in order to reach an understanding. For a man 
to really understand what birth pains are like; for a young 
person who has led a life free of serious pain to understand 
the sensations involved in terminal cancer; the necessary 
experiences are inaccessible. In the absence of experience, 
our knowledge of feelings is limited to the externally observ-
able and causal, and must fail to be knowledge of mental states 
as we might otherwise be able to understand them. 
Clearly, if there is a need to see the mental states of 
others as being analogous to our own in order that we really 
understand, our EMP and PHIL interests are likely to coincide 
at some point. Wilson points out that "EMP does not of course 
logically imply PHIL, although as a matter of psychological fact 
it may be that one cannot develop in such a way as to have much 
EMP without regarding them as equals: but how many such cases 
exist in practice is a matter for further research". The 
necessary "analogy" is a matter of psychological equivalence 
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rather than moral equality with respect to interests, but the 
general point still stands, for it depends upon the recognition 
of the self and other as equally human. Thus the development 
of both of these components depends upon the acquisition of 
certain common concepts. If literature can assist students to 
understand otherwise unintelligible emotional states by picking 
out important elements and enabling them to draw analogies they 
otherwise would not have considered, then it will playa part 
in the attainment of PHIL as well as in the development of the 
ability to work out how others feel. The concern of this 
thesis is, however, with the use of literature to develop the 
latter alone. 
It is not difficult to accept the claim that literature 
can help to develop the ability to work out the feelings of 
others. Further analysis is needed, however, before we will 
be able to come to terms with the task of capitalising on this 
fact in educational programs, for a number of questions begin 
to arise as soon as we begin to look at the claim more closely. 
In the first place we must consider whether such a use of 
literature is incompatible with a literary education. To 
answer this question we will need to consider what is involved 
in coming to know how another person feels, and try to ascertain 
whether the use of these procedures to understand characters in 
literature is detrimental to the interests of literary study. 
The position being defended in this thesis is that some of the 
procedures we wish to develop for a moral education are not 
only compatible with literary study, but are in fact necessary 
parts of a critic's repertoire. A further question we might 
wish to consider is whether or not all literature is valuable 
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for this purpose. It may be the case that some is of no use, 
or that particular pieces of literature are of use for 
particular aspects of the procedures only. And finally, we 
might wish, of course, to consider the extent to which 
particular pieces of literature are of value to particular 
students. It will not be possible to give answers to all these 
complex questions here. This thesis is essentially a "ground 
clearing exercise " - a preliminary analysis which, it is hoped, 
will enable us to point out the directions in which more 
complete answers can be sought. 
The first step will be to consider the various kinds of 
feelings which other people might have: to consider the logical 
characteristics of these feelings and the kinds of demands and 
limitations they impose upon our attempts to understand them. 
We will then investigate the kinds of procedures we must employ 
when we attempt to cope with the differences between our own 
experiences and the experiences of others. The sources of the 
facts upon which we employ these procedures will be discussed 
in Chapter IV, and an example from literature will be used to 
demonstrate how these facts and procedures can be used to gain 
an understanding of the feelings of a character in fiction. 
Chapter V will be concerned with the nature of literature. It 
will be argued that our experience of art is not merely linked 
to the world, but that part of the value of art arises out of 
the valued changes in our perception of the world which art 
facilitates. In addition, it will be held that many of these 
valued experiences, particularly in works of literature, are 
of an ethical nature which requires, in many cases, that the 
emotional experiences of the characters be made apparent to us 
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as they might appear in real life. There are, however, some 
difficulties imposed by the ethical demands of these works and 
by the artistic necessity of constructing an object which is 
to be experienced. The final chapter will draw the threads of 
these arguments together and indicate general answers to the 
questions posed above . 
Something needs to be said about the use of "knowing" in 
"knowing how other people feel". We are concerned here with 
a task sense of "knowing" - with an attempt to see how we can 
best satisfy the evidence condition of the concept of "know-
ledge" . "Knowing how other people feel" is used in preference 
to "'insight into' or 'awareness of' the feelings of others " 
in order that we remain conscious of the need for a sound 
evidential basis for our beliefs concerning other people's 
feelings. It is recognised, however, that the logical problems 
of producing such evidence is a central issue in the philosophy 
of mind . We must acknowledge therefore that our use of "know" 
in this context is very much a "weak sense". But it is never-
theless a legitimate use, without which much of moral philosophy 
and practical affairs would not be possible. 
16 
CHAP TER I I THE LANGUAGE OF FEELING 
We must attempt to make a clear distinction between "sen-
sations", which are felt as "twinges", "sinkings" , "tickles", 
"flushes" and "throbs", and those event13 which we call 
"emotions".8 Although these are experienced partly as sensa-
tions when we are in the grip of them, they are characterised 
by causes arising from perceived events . Unlike the causes of 
sensations, the causes of emotions are made up at least in part 
by our beliefs and values. These causes are not limited to 
such things as bad digestion, hard seats, flesh damaged by 
kitchen doors or creeping diseases . Emotions must occur 
directly as a consequence of thoughts which have arisen, events 
we have .observed, or things we otherwise have knowledge of as 
a result of having sensed them and about which we believe 
certain things. 
This distinction is not crystal clear in ordinary language 
once we depart from central cases . We experience states such 
as moods which may be the product of certain events about which 
we have certain beliefs - the noisy class may put us in a bad 
mood because we believe that it should not be noisy but seem 
unable to do anything about it - or they may be produced by a 
run- down physical condition, a refreshing breeze, or drugs. 
Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between feelings 
which are caused at least partially by beliefs and values and 
those which are not, for these two kinds of causes make different 
demands with respect to our understanding when we attempt to 
8White, A.R., The Philosophy of Mind, Random House, New Yo r k, 
1967. Pages 110, 124. 
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work out how others feel. 
I Sensations 
When we feel an "itch", "twinge", "tickle" or "pain", it 
is not an object such as a feather or a pin which we feel, but 
a sensation. We may also feel the feather which caresses us, 
but feeling the tickle is not the same as feeling the feather. 
Sensations are frequently "hallmarked" with a particular loca-
tion in our body, even when we no longer have that part of the 
body, as when a soldier might feel his toe itching or burning 
after he has lost his leg. Knowledge of the location of a 
sensation need not tell us anything about its cause, although 
doctors might find certain pains as being symptomatic of certain 
ff 1 · h' 9 cause- e ect re atlons lpS. 
The moral relevance of a knowledge of the sensations 
others feel arises from the necessity of promoting the well -
being of others - of alleviating their suffering or "defusing" 
situations which might cause people to have unpleasant 
experiences. The point is related to, although not quite the 
same as the avoidance of actions which might impair someone's 
health. Laboratory experiments in which subjects undergo 
painful electric shocks may still provoke an outcry on moral 
grounds even when it has been shown that no permanent injury 
will result. In addition (as will be discussed in more detail 
later), although having a sensation is not a necessary condition 
of having an emotion it is sometimes symptomatic. "My heart 
sank" and "I had a lump in my throat" are expressions which 
sometimes indicate sensations and (very probably) emotions as 
well. 
9 . d Ibl .. Page Ill. 
t 
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We acquire knowledge of other people's sensations from 
what we are told, from postural and facial expressions (winces, 
grimaces, laughter, "eyes - lighting-up") and from certain other 
physiological changes such as pallor, deep breathing and 
sweating. All of this evidence is more or less subject to 
falsification due to lying or pretending: wincing more so than 
pallor for example. People can steel themselves to avoid 
showing pain. This same problem exists with regard to the 
emotions themselves, but it is less of a problem in both cases 
if we know the person well. 
Judging whether other people feel the same sensations 
that we feel is not easy, although perhaps not as difficult as 
assessing emotions. We all have considerable evidence of 
individ~al variability in respect of these feelings - other 
people feel too hot or too cold when we feel quite comfortable. 
In many instances a certain amount of experience of physio-
logical matters is required - some particularly unpleasant-
looking wounds and diseases are relatively painless. Certain 
emotional states can "blot out" sensations which would otherwise 
be felt strongly. Men intent on particular tasks live through 
situations or experience wounds without feeling any particular 
sensations when we would normally expect them to be in some 
pain. A considerable amount of information about the experiences 
of different people in a wide range of situations is necessary 
if we are to have some idea of what to expect: information from 
the medical sciences and anecdotal information from literature 
as well as from everyday life may be valuable. In addition, 
our ability to tell how someone feels may depend on how well we 
know him - whether he feels the cold, is sensitive to pain or is 
t 
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ticklish may, on occasion, be relevant. 
We face formidable difficulties in our efforts to "under-
stand" when there is a considerable gap between the sensations 
the other person is experiencing and the sensations we have 
known . It is sometimes logically imp9ssible (as in the case 
of a man and birth pains) and at others practically undesirable 
(as in the case of extreme agonies) for us to seek the 
necessary experience. And there is no way comparable to the 
reconstruction of another person's point of view which will help 
us to close this gap as we can where emotions are concerned. 
There are behavioural clues which will help us to tell that the 
pain is very bad or the pleasant sensation very pleasant and 
we can often be guided to the location of the sensation if it 
has a specific location. But these bits of information do not 
take us very far toward understanding what the sensation is like. 
We must depend upon the other person reporting his experience 
by making the analogy for us in terms of things we have felt. 
"It feels like - ", or "it's as if this, and this, and this were 
happening" . The experience must be reconstructed piecemeal 
in this fashion, and any pieces which are missed out, or for 
which an analogy is not found, cannot be filled in by the 
imagination. There is no "logic" to sensations, the unravelling 
of which will permit us to understand what it is like to feel 
something very different from anything we have previously felt . 
The beliefs and values which structure emotions may not be 
rational, but at least they have a coherence which enables such 
, t'" d t d' 10 lnves 19atlons to lncrease our un ers an lng. Works of 
literature often employ metaphor and simile to draw attention to 
10 See Chapter III. Page 42. 
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such analogies in detailed descriptions of the sensations 
accompanying many experiences. In this way they provide access 
to a knowledge of "what it is like" which would not otherwise be 
very readily available to us since our knowledge of these 
experiences of other people depends very much on their verbal 
ability. 
Our capacity to understand what it is like to experience 
the sensations which other people experience, dependent as this 
is upon the things we have felt in the past, is very much a 
limiting factor in our attempts to understand the emotions of 
others, for no matter how successful we may be in reconstructing 
their manner of perceiving a situation, we will be limited by 
this factor when we attempt to understand what it might be to 
be "in t~e grip" of the emotion - a matter largely of being 
swept by sensations. "Emotion" and "sensation" are not two 
exclusive categories, and it is important to give some attention 
to the relationship between them. 
To be angry we do not have to be feeling any particular 
sensations all of the time or at any particular time. George 
Pitcher draws a distinction between what he calls "disposi-
tional" and "occurrent" emotions. ll John, we may say, is 
furious with his boss - has been all week, and will be for some 
time to come. Our friend might counter that John seemed very 
mild- mannered and even- tempered when we spoke to him a moment 
ago. "Ah", we might reply, "but his boss wasn't mentioned in 
the conversation, was he?" We would predict a furious outburst 
from John if his attention were directed to his boss. John 
llpitcher, G. , "Emotion", Mind, vol. LXXIV, 1965. Page 332. 
l 
21 
has been, and will continue to be, "disposed" to this fury. 
The "occurrent" emotion is the outburst; the emotion which is 
felt. Clearly one need not feel any particular sensation when 
one is disposed to feeling a certain thing as opposed to 
actually feeling it. Characteristically, when we feel 
occurrent fear our heart races, we feel weak at the knees, our 
heart seems to sink, our scalp tingles and we perspire but are 
cold. When we are embarrassed we blush, and when we are angry 
our face burns and we sometimes tremble. Particular sensations 
are not conceptually linked to particular emotions, but when we 
have an emotion occurrently we must feel some combination of 
sensations. 
II Emotions 
The feelings which we shall call "emotions" are linked 
with matters of perception which can be considered as forming 
a distinctive class of causes. A student is in a very great 
state of fear which has been caused largely by L.S.D. But 
his fear is also intimately bound up with the clock on the 
table from which he is shrinking. There are difficulties with 
this kind of example, of course. If we are to demonstrate that 
we have located the object of his fear it must be possible for 
us to show that the student believes at the time that there are 
good reasons for ' viewing the presence of the clock as some sort 
of threat. It is his reaction to the clock which leads us to 
describe his behaviour as fearful, and the description is 
logically linked to the way he sees the clock at this moment. 
Hirst and Peters talk of this element - a cognitive element of 
emotion - as "appraisal". 
To feel fear, for instance, is to see a situation as 
l 
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dangerous, to feel pride is to see with pleasure something 
as ours or as something that we have had a hand in 
bringing about. Envy is connected with seeing someone 
else as possessing something or someone to which or whom 
we think we have a right, and so on. The appraisal in 
each case has a feeling side to it. If fear is felt, 
seeing something as dangerous is different from seeing it 
as three feet high or as green, in that it is non-
neutral. 12 
Pitcher speaks of apprehension, or misapprehension of the 
object of emotion. He suggests that inclinations, wants, 
desires and beliefs underly emotions and tha.t they have a more 
than empirical link to a form"of positive or negative evalua-
tion which characterises emotional behaviour. His use of 
"apprehension" and "evaluation" seems very similar to Hirst and 
Peters' use of "appraisal " . 
The term "evaluation", as I am using it, is not meant to 
suggest that the person must make an evaluational judge-
ment, or even that he must have what might be called an 
evaluational belief. Sometimes the evaluation will be 
constituted by a conscious judgement or by a belief or 
assumption, but sometimes not. For example, if Q slaps 
P in the face, and P becomes angry at this, one would not 
want to say that P judges Q's action was a bad thing or 
even that he believes it to be. He may only angrily 
strike Q in return. Still, one wants to say something 
about piS attitude to Q's act in the evaluational 
dimension: and whatever the most appropriate locution 
might be in this case, I think it not wholly unnatural to 
say, as I do, that it will designate a species of negative 
emotion. 13 
Most of us would want to say more than Pitcher seems 
prepared to say, however. The striking of Q is evidence of 
the anger but in itself it gives no clue to the "angry " descrip-
tion, except empirically (Ps who strike Qs in such circumstances 
usually do so because they are angry ) . We must be able to say 
something about how P is perceiving the situation before we can 
12Hirst, P.H. and Peters, R. S., The Logic of Education, Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1970. Page 49. 
13Pitcher, G., op.cit . Page 334. 
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describe his response as "angry" . P cannot believe, f or 
example, that Q's slap was an affectionate pat . We must be 
able to say certain things about pIS beliefs - that he believes 
the slap to be an attack or an affront. Pitcher's own account 
suggests this when he argues that we can judge emotions in 
terms of their rationality. Presumably the beliefs which 
constitute the appraisal are the things which we judge. 
A feature of some of these appraisals which must receive 
some attention might generally be called their " focus " . 
-Usually it is said that central cases of emotions such as anger, 
jealousy, love, hate and fear are "directed toward an object " , 
a description which must be distinguished from "caused by" 
(something ) , although it is not always ruled out that an 
"object'~ can be a "cause". The sense in which emotions have 
these "objects " is the subject of considerable debate . Gosling 
has argued that attention paid to prepositions in statements 
such as "John is angry with Jim" provides only a poor test for 
identifying objects of emotion since this alone might be 
compatible with more than one object (John is angry about X ) • 
The "must " entailment suggested by the assertion that John must 
be angry about something does not carry us very far. He also 
points out that the "target" metaphor employed by Wittgenstein 
(the emotion being directed toward something ) works better for 
some emotions than it does for others - "anger" and "gratitude" 
as opposed to "fear" and "shame" for example. 
He also shows that the concept of the "object " itself 
may introduce confusing elements lnto the discussion . Any of 
three senses may be involved. 
b 
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First there is the simple grammatical sense : the object 
governed by verb or p r eposition. Second there is the 
physical object sense; and third, there is the lIobject 
of concern ll sense - -. 
These senses may, however, part company, causing uncer-
tainty in such cases as pride. If I feel proud of my 
house it is tempting to think of the house as the object 
of my pride, partly because it is what the preposition 
governs and partly because it is.a relevant object. 
Yet there is an attraction in Hume's view that pride is 
directed towards oneself and one's own reputation; it is 
my own reputation, not my house, that I have mainly in 
mind when I am proud of my house. That is the real 
object of pride, the objective of the proud man. His 
concern is always with his own name. 14 
Attempts to establish a criterion which will distinguish 
between statements linking an emotion with its object from 
those linking it to a cause which is not the object have proved 
to be generally unsatisfactory. It is important for our task 
that some useful progress be made in this respect for it is clear 
that however the difference is actually formulated, there is an 
important difference in the structure of the appraisal and the 
relationship between the appraisal and the emotion when emotions 
which have objects are compared with those which do not. Some 
knowledge of the object is necessary before many emotions can 
be identified. This does not mean that the object must be a 
particular kind of thing, but it must be something which can be 
viewed in a particular way. Thus, for fear it must be capable 
of being seen as a threat, for gratitude it must be possible to 
see it as a source of unlooked for aid. Emotions which do not 
have objects may be caused by appraisals, but are not logically 
dependent upon them. The news of the world over the last week 
may depress us, the sunny weather and the Spring clothes may 
make us feel elated or joyful, but such feelings need not be 
14GoSling, J.e., IIEmotion and Objectll, Philosophical Review, 
vol. LXXIV, 1965. Page 489. 
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determined by our pe r ceptions at all . Dr ugs ·might be enough . 
And although drugs may also cause fear, we still will not call 
the emotion fear unless we can locate the object e xcept in 
special cases. The special cases are, like "intuitive know-
ledge", qualified to show that a condition is withdrawn as in 
"fear of I - knew - not- what" or "unknown dreads". 
It is easy enough, of course, to suggest that the present 
approach to analysing the......concept of the "object" of an emotion 
is unsatisfactory, but more difficult to indicate a more 
fruitful line of attack. One approach is to point out how 
different emotions are one from the other and suggest that many 
individual solutions will be needed. Another approach might be 
to argue that more account must be taken of the situation within 
which the object is embedded. Let us pursue the "focus" 
analogy and suppose, for example, that a man is confronting us 
with a gun and we are scared. Clearly we would ordinarily say 
that the object of our fear is the man with the gun. The 
"threat" is the threat to our life or the threat of injury. 
We see the man with the gun as a threat because a lot of things 
seem quite probable - the gun "might " be loaded, the man "might" 
intend to shoot us or frighten us or he "might" be careless. 
He "might" pull the trigger. The bullet "might" hit us, and 
hence injure or wound us. The only reason we name the man as 
the object is that he is the physically present " focus" of these 
considerations. He " represents" a situation waiting for a 
cause to set off a chain of harmful events. We fear possible 
or probable consequences of events not occurrent events them-
selves. The loading of the gun, the pulling of the trigger, 
the hitting of the bullet, the death, are possible outcomes of 
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the situation "man- pointing- a - gun- at- us" . If we are concerned 
to pick out as the object the elements of the occurrent situa-
tion which make it more or less probable that this chain of 
events will occur then we should attend to such things as the 
man's intentions or his dispositions, or perhaps his quivering 
trigger finger. Our ordinary language specification of the 
object of the emotion as "the man with the gun" would, on this 
view, need to be seen as defining the rough location of the 
object. And it seems probable that most of us would agree 
that this is a case in which the object of the emotion has been 
clearly identified. 
But what would we want to say about a farmer who fears 
that rain will ruin his grain before it is harvested? His grain 
is ripe but will take some days to harvest . If it rains before 
the crop is in it will sprout and be ruined. This would be 
very serious for him since one poor crop will force him to 
abandon the farm. He shows his fear by cajoling, harassing and 
overemploying workers, and by paying them more generously than 
usual. He has sleepless nights and goes pale and grits his 
teeth when anyone mentions rain. No one w~uld deny that such 
a man is afraid, and all would agree that his is not an object-
less fear, but that the object is to be found in the situation 
which has arisen - that his grain crop is vulnerable to rain. 
The ordinary language locution we would look to for the object 
would be "the farmer fears rain" or "fears that it will rain" 
or something of the sort. In that the chain of harmful events 
would be set in motion by whatever causes rain, we would expect 
the object to be the occurrent disposition of the climate with 
respect to rain. Even if there is not a cloud in the sky he 
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must feel he has some reason to suspect that such a disposition 
might exist, just as we felt we had reason to e xpect a trigger-
pulling disposition in the man with the gun - the climate may 
merely be somewhat unp r edictable fo r this condition to be met . 
How much evidence of rain he needs before the possibility becomes 
one for him to fear may depend upon the seriousness with which 
he views the vulnerability of the crop. In this case then, to 
fear rain is similar to fearing the flying bullet - a possible 
future event which might not occur . The rain does not exist 
and might never e xist. And we do not fear probabilities as 
such but the potential outcomes of present states of affairs . 
Such a case would be similar to saying that a man walking at 
night in a dangerous and poorly policed neighbourhood fea r s 
flying bullets when there are no flying bullets but some reason 
to believe that he might yet be accosted by an armed robber . 
"Fears rain", or "that it will rain" are very much more c r ude 
specifications of the object than "the man with the gun", but 
this is not surprising since it would otherwise be a complicated 
climatological matter to specify the locus of the object more 
precisely. This is the limitation of such ordinary language 
descriptions. When we ask what the farmer fears we want to 
understand the "focus" of his activity and his obvious distress . 
We do not want a detailed account of the mechanics of the local 
weather - our everyday demand is merely to be pointed in the 
right direction. And this description suffices . But it might 
still appropriately be used of our farmer if black clouds were 
massing on the horizon, although the situation would no longer 
be the same - his appraisal would be different as would the more 
precise specification of the object. It is thus misleading to 
> 
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attempt to find criteria for identifying the objects of emotions 
from the grammar of such simple everyday descriptions. We are 
likely to be led to such patently false positions as the one 
outlined by J.R.S. Wilson when he says that "some would say that 
fear or hope that something will be the case are not properly 
speaking emotions. It certainly sounds odd to say that 
someone who is afraid that it is going to rain, or fears that 
the budget will be tough this year, is feeling an emotion". 
He comes to this conclusion beca~e he does not want to extend 
the use of "object" to cover cases which relate to possible 
future events. We can see that such a conclusion arises from 
insufficient attention to the situations in which such emotions 
. 15 
arlse. 
Although it is not possible to give a clear account of 
"objects" of emotions at this time, what we have somewhat 
crudely termed the "focus" of an emotion is of considerable 
importance to our interests. For clearly, knowledge of whether 
or not an emotion has an object, or what the object is if it 
has one, will have a bearing on decisions as to what action 
should be taken in the interests of others. Knowing that the 
man has been disarmed, or that he is not disposed to fire the 
gun, or that it is not loaded would each serve to alleviate our 
distress. Helping to get the harvest in quickly will help to 
relieve the farmer. But in the case of objectless emotions 
our knowledge of any of the elements of the appraisal which 
caused the emotion may not directly assist us in deciding how 
we should act to reduce distress. If our friend is depressed 
15wilson, J.R.S., Emotion and Object, Cambridge University 
Press, London, 1972. Page 58. 
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today because, through coming to work by an unusual route he 
passed along a street of ugly buildings, we might not change 
his mood by having the buildings demolished or erasing them 
from his memory (he may have forgotten all about the buildings 
and may "just be depressed" ) . We may be forced instead to 
consider quite unrelated things - things which will cheer him 
up. 
Even if it were not sometimes very difficult to locate the 
precise object of any particular emotion, it would be clear that 
there are factors external to the particular appraisal which 
can increase the difficulty of the task of locating the object. 
We are, for example, liable to confuse the object of an emotion 
with the object of its expression. When we see a man angrily 
kicking a tin can we are unlikely to pick out the can as the 
object of his anger. There will be other times when the object 
of the emotion will be the same as the object of expression (P 
strikes Q) . But there will also be many cases where the 
objects, though different, will not be obviously different, and 
we may be led to misunderstand the nature of the other person's 
emotion because of this. 
Another situation which makes locating the objects of 
emotions difficult is when more than one emotion arises out of 
one set of circumstances. We may be thrilled at the prospect 
of winning a lot of money but fear that we will lose some of 
our friends as a result. We may look forward eagerly to our 
chance to excel in front of our peers but also be afraid of 
looking ridiculous. Locating- the different objects in such 
cases can be quite a difficult business, particularly if there 
are many emotions intricately intermeshed. Ryle called such 
-
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states when feelings pull against each other "agitations", and 
it is clear that such "mixed feelings" are commonly present in 
cases where we have trouble understanding what another person 
, f I' 16 1S ee 1ng . 
We have little difficulty identifying the typical struc-
ture of the appraisals of a large range of central cases of most 
feelings. We know the general emotion which will arise in an 
ordinary man who is placed without-protection in a cage of 
hungry lions, or has the noose lowered around his neck in 
preparation for the hanging. We do not need to have had these 
experiences to be able to say something specific about the 
intensity of the emotion or the sensations involved, since we 
all recognise these as fear - evoking situations. When people 
do not feel fear in these circumstances they provide us with 
"special cases" - their behaviour calls for explanation. The 
same applies to sensations. We know that putting a hand in 
the fire will cause pain, that dried leaves down the neck will 
itch, that soles of the feet which are stroked with a feather 
will tickle. These are central cases: to fail to understand 
them is to be unable to use correctly some of the language 
concerned with feeling. Such cases are central to the basic 
vocabulary of feeling words - and the association between case 
and emotion is usually made in early childhood. What is not 
learned early - what is, in fact our constant problem of know-
ledge, is how to cope with variability between people. Our 
central cases are simple. Most people would feel alike in 
these situations described above. But how do we cope with 
16 Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind, Peregrine, 1963. Page 90 . 
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situations where people might be expected to differ in their 
feelings? The problem is to know what will function as a 
cause for a particular feeling in anyone person. 
The matter of working out how other people appraise a 
situation (which is, after all, fundamental to working out what 
emotion a person will feel ) will depend either on our being 
able to assume a common set of relevant values and beliefs or 
on the knowledge we have of the values and beliefs which 
constitute the other person's form of life. But it must be 
remembered that these kinds of information will ' contribute to 
our knowledge of his appraisal only - we will know some of the 
factors which will cause the person to appraise a situation in 
a particular way but this may not constitute a complete speci-
fication of the causes of his emotion. John may be angry with 
us for using his pen without his permission. His appraisal 
may be based on certain beliefs he has about the way people 
ought to behave and about property rights. But it may be the 
case that where we are concerned this would usually not result 
in anger since we are good friends. On this occasion, however, 
he is in an irritable mood which contributes to his appraisal. 
The mood itself is one that does not involve an appraisal - it 
is a product of late nights, bad food and a lumpy bed. As we 
move away from appraisals the explanation of the feelings ceases 
to involve values and beliefs, but rather depends on medical 
and physiological knowledge and their everyday equivalents for 
an understanding of causation. 
Two main interests may control our attempts to understand 
the emotions and sensations experienced by others . We may wish 
to understand what it is that they are experiencing now, or we may 
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want to predict what they will be feeling in the futur e. The 
first case is easier, for we have the evidence of the person's 
occurrent behaviour against which to check our attempts to 
reconstruct his feelings f rom knowledge we have gained through 
past experience. Prediction is more difficult because of the 
absence of this possibility of verification . It is however 
an extremely important task from the moral point of view, since 
we must frequently attempt to discover whether actions we might 
take will be to the detriment of others. In addition, many 
features of the problem of prediction can be pr;sent in 
occurrent situations when people succeed in hiding their 
feelings from us by acting or lying. This throws us entirely 
upon our past experience and, where emotions are involved, upon 
our ability to reconstruct the other person's point of view. 
The task of such reconstruction will be the concern of the next 
chapter. 
33 
CHAPTER III THE TASK OF KNOWING 
The point has already been made that people differ over 
the things which function as the objects of their emotions and 
the things which serve to cause them. The analogy between our 
feelings and their expression and the feelings and expressions 
of other people provides only the base point. Since it is not 
inevitable that a feeling be expressed, and because more than 
one form of expression is often possible, various bits of 
behaviour are not of necessity tied to particular feelings. 
People can express their feelings in different ways. Conse-
quently the relationship between feeling and expression may not 
be the same in other people as it is in ourselves on any 
occasion due to differences of biology, personality and, cultural 
expectations. The basic analogy between ourselves and others 
permits communication as well as the public assessment of know-
ledge claims. But if we depend upon this analogy to the extent 
that we fail to take account of the point at which it breaks 
down - and hence do not take account of the differences between 
ourselves and others in terms of both the expression and causa-
tion of feelings - we will be unable to do more than project our 
own feelings in situations where we wish to know. It is 
difficult for children to understand adult love, because they 
fail to appreciate the force of the differences between adults 
and themselves. A man who wishes to understand how a woman 
feels throughout menarche or menopause will not only have to take 
cognizance of the physical differences (and an understanding of 
the effects of these on feeling may, of course, be impossible ) 
but of the cultural ones as well. It should be clear that the 
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capacity to cope with the differences between ourselves and 
others when we wish to know how they feel depends on our know-
ledge of these differences and our success at predicting their 
effects. This capacity is learned in part through the force 
of certain experiences which we have had in confrontations with 
other people and through reliable authorities of many kinds who 
have done the experiencing, sifted and weighed the evidence for 
us. 
Since we do not have direct access to the minds of other 
people we must draw inferences about their emotional states 
from our observations of their behaviour and the situations in 
which particular behaviours arise. The relationship between 
our own feelings and behaviour is relatively clear to us. We 
know that when we happen to be blushing it is also quite likely 
that we will be seeing events in such a way as to be embarrassed 
by them. We know that our pallor, perspiration and shaky 
retreat accompanies our fear. When we see another person pale, 
perspiring and retreating we know that, although this behaviour 
may indicate various things with different degrees of proba-
bility, fear is one of the things which are highly probable. 
This collection of events which we attach to a particular 
emotion concept, and which we use not only to infer the presence 
of the emotion, but also the locus of the object, the structure 
of the appraisal and the existence of any other causes, shall 
be called an "interpretive scheme". With the passing of time 
we learn more about different causes of emotion, different 
structures of belief and different social conventions, any of 
which may determine the occurrence of a feeling and its 
expression in behaviour. 
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The limits of an interpretive scheme are marked out by 
the rules governing the logic of the emotion concept. Events 
are not part of the scheme if they are not seen as related 
either logically or contingently to some feature of these 
rules. If X hits Y with whom he is angry, the focus of his 
attention toward Y is logically related to the fact that Y is 
the object of his anger. The fact that XiS face is flushed is 
only contingently related, however, dependent as this is upon 
certain physiological dispositions. 
The interpretive scheme is not structured , merely as a 
collection of events, but as a collection of events which 
"indicate" something about the emotion, either by permitting us 
to pick out causes of behaviour or beliefs and rules governing 
such th~ngs as perceptions. These events which fall under a 
scheme need not be limited to pieces of behaviour occurrently 
exhibited by a person feeling an emotion. They may be pieces 
of behaviour in the past which indicated the presence of 
certain beliefs. And they are not events strictly limited to 
the behaviour of the individual but will often include features 
of the situation in which the behaviour occurred. Thus the 
scheme, as it becomes more elaborated, consists of more 
sophisticated beliefs about the ways in which people demonstrate 
what they believe by the ways in which they behave, and how 
their beliefs structure into appraisals and modify the expres-
sion of emotions akin to ones we have felt, though the beliefs 
are different from those we hold and the situation is different 
from anything we have confronted. And further, the scheme 
shows us the conditions under which other relevant dispositions 
change to contribute to an emotion. 
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When we are asked to substantiate a claim to know how 
another person feels it may be appropriate to give the immediate 
facts upon which the claim is based. How do you know he was 
angry? Well, he was red in the face, shouting, thumping the 
table, throwing ornaments across the room. These kinds of 
facts assume an interpretive scheme which will be understood by 
both the person making the claim and the person who is asking 
for the claim to be supported. But the person making the 
request may, of course, be asking for the interpretive scheme 
itself to be spelled out. "How do you know he, was angry?" -
may mean "show me how it is that these pieces of behaviour 
should correctly be interpreted as 'angry'". The analogy 
between our feelings and those of other people is logically 
prior to any answer to such a question. Thus, there will be 
facts about our feelings in certain situations. Upon these 
will be built facts concerning the ways in which our appraisals 
of a given situation would be modified if our beliefs were 
different in specifiable ways. 
If answering the question involves us in presenting the 
immediate facts, then the validity of our claim depends upon 
our reliability as observers - as instruments for recording facts 
- since in this case the interpretive scheme is assumed. If 
answering the question involves us in spelling out the inter-
pretive scheme, however, we will be involved in showing that 
our beliefs are rational. 
Q I How do you know he is angry? 
A He is shouting . 
Q 2 But how do you know he is angry? 
A Most men are angry when they shout like that . 
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To be able to answer 1, one must be able to point to a parti -
ocular fact (shouting man) and invoke 2. To learn 2 is a 
complicated feat. A very simple way of explaining how we learn 
2 would be to say that it is an inductive matter . We learn that 
most men are angry when they shout like that from the sheer 
number of occasions when we shouted when we felt angry, and from 
the weight of instances when we have seen men shout when they 
were (for other reasons obvious to us at the time) clearly angry . 
But we cannot, by this means, establish the truth of our belief 
that, as a rule, men are angry when they shout like that. 
N th O h h h 0 0 f 0 17 o lng muc angs on t e repetltlon 0 lnstances. Once it 
occurs to us that our shout is linked to our anger, repeated 
instances can tell us nothing new, and it is possible that the 
conjecture may be made after the first instance. Much of our 
learning is, of course, like this. We usually need only one 
instance to see the relationship between the burnt finger and 
the fire. To see the value of the generalisation its limits 
must be tested by seeing where it doesn't apply to our own 
behaviour or the behaviour of others. Where we note, for 
example, that an obviously angry man makes no sound while he is 
in church, we have a case through which, by investigating the 
facts, we may be able to modify our belief about the rules 
governing his behaviour and acquire a new one. We may find, 
for example, that beliefs about appropriate behaviour in church 
modify his otherwise predictable disposition to express anger 
by shouting. The point is that, although repeated cases may 
be needed before we see that the two factors are related, the 
l7Popper, K., Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, London, 1963. Page 46. 
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beliefs built into the various interpretive schemes need not be 
based on more than one instance - perhaps someone pointed out 
the relationship between these sets of beliefs, and this was 
enough to establish it in our scheme. 
In order to cope with the differences between the way we 
feel in a given situation and the way another person might feel 
we need to have experienced a wide range of emotions and 
achieved some degree of self- understanding. We also need a 
considerable body of facts about other people. Of the myriad 
facts available to us only a relatively few are selected to 
support our belief that a person is feeling or will feel a 
certain thing. This selection is in accord with certain 
principles which are derived from our own emotional lives, and 
from our knowledge of the way certain sets of beliefs cohere 
into systems. The whole business of the selecting and the 
fitting of these facts into a particular interpretive scheme 
must, however, conform to certain rational procedures if the 
claim to know how another person feels is to be supported. It 
must, in principle, be possible for any rational man to return 
to the initial observations and verify the interpretations. 
The problem with this task is the matter of coming to 
terms with the differences between ourselves and others. This 
is not merely a matter of recognising when other people are 
expressing or indicating emotions in ways which are foreign to 
our own modes of behaviour or patterns of responses, but also a 
matter of recognising that certain events will cause certain 
emotional states to occur in other people when these same events 
would not act as causes or would cause different kinds of emotion 
in ourselves. In addition, to perform the task we would need 
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to work out the effects of specific events in specific cases. 
This chapter will be concerned with the procedures involved in 
"working the calculus": of putting oneself in another person's 
place. 
The argument thus far has been an attempt to show that our 
knowledge of other people's emotional states depends upon the 
assumption that what they are feeling when they exhibit certain 
pieces of observable behaviour is analogous to what we feel when 
we behave in similar ways. This point is logically bound up 
with the assumption that human behaviour can be explained in 
terms of certain consistencies. For another person's behaviour 
to be intelligible then we must reconstruct his point of view 
in the light of experiences we have had. 
I Imagination 
To construct another person's way of appraising a parti-
cular situation we must neutralise our own way of viewing it 
and correctly construct another appraisal. We must, firstly, 
recognise that there is a disparity between our view and the 
view of another, and to have done this is of course to have 
constructed a new view. To make such a "recognition" is to 
cease to be dominated by our own perceptions. We now believe 
that there are other ways of viewing the facts. This is a 
matter of seeing the effects of our prejudices and values upon 
our appraisals. In developmental terms, Piaget discusses this 
as decreasing egocentricity. The young child is unable to see 
a situation in terms of any perspective but his own. Little 
Johnny's egocentricity may mean that when someone suffers to 
his benefit he is quite unable to see or appreciate the other 
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person's suffering since his point of view is determined by the 
pleasure resulting from his benefit . Such an example seems 
plausible in the case of a young child but implausible in the 
case of an adult until we consider cases of prejudice. A bigot 
may be so indignant at having a Negro sit beside him on the bus, 
that any possibility of him understanding the man's humiliation 
at being thrown off would be negated. Or a situation might 
shock or appal us to the extent that we are unable to conceive 
that other people might be delighted. A puritan's horror at 
certain passages in Lady Chatterly's Lover may, for example, 
have prevented him from attending to those aspects of the novel 
which delighted literary critics. It may be the case that we 
can, in a cool moment, work out the other point of view, but we 
will be in sufficient difficulty if our own heightened feelings 
of the moment make it impossible at the time. 
The problem is not as simple as that of overcoming the 
egocentricity which is apparent in the behaviour of the young 
child who believes that the moon follows him when he walks at 
night, for our prejudices and concerns are embedded in beliefs 
and value systems which develop as we grow older, and of which 
we may be unaware. They are not merely matters of race and 
creed and colour but work across ages, between sexes, life-
styles, aesthetic views, political beliefs, modes of dress and 
manners. "Prejudice" is a pejorative word because it is 
concerned with an irrational element in thought and action. 
But we expect even a rational man to have certain firm convic-
tions - and these may on occasion intervene when it is necessary 
to consider another person's "point of view". To be horrified 
at the actions and the feelings of the Nazi or the Afrikaner may 
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be to be hindered in working out how such people appraise thei r 
world . To be moral the rational man may need such feelings, 
but he must also know when and how to keep them in check. 
But to reconstruct the appraisal of another is to do more 
than come to believe that there are other ways of viewing the 
facts, for we may overcome our egocentricity but be quite wrong 
about what the other point of view actually is. Imagining 
what another person's point of view is like is a task which can 
be performed with varying degrees of success. It is very 
similar to the Piagetian kind of problem where subjects may have 
to indicate what it would be like to be viewing a model house 
with a tree beside it, which, viewed from the other side of 
the table, would be seen with the tree in the reverse position, 
the chimney displaced and the walls at different angles . 
Subjects must accomplish some mental construction to complete 
this task. But our tasks are more complicated than this since 
the differences with which we must contend are not merely 
spatial. We can readily suppose that the Piagetian set of 
logical operations available to the formal operational child 
will probably be required for these more sophisticated problems . 
Certainly, reversibility is needed, as can be seen in the case 
where we attempt to work back from a person's occurrent emotion 
to reconstruct the particulars of his appraisal. Some of the 
particulars we hypothesize at certain points may not measure 
up adequately against the extent of his occurrent emotion and 
we may be required to undo what we have done or return to an 
earlier point and explore it more fully. But, of course, the 
whole business of seeing something from another person's point 
of view is predicated on our ability to shuffle back and forth 
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between another way of looking at things and our own . 
It is not possible here to give an account of the logical 
priorities in the acquisition of the particular procedures 
required for the performance of these tasks, although clearly 
such investigations are of considerable educational importance . 
What will be attended to more closely, however, is the form of 
the construction. 
II The Structure of Appraisals 
Beliefs and values cohere into systems. It is this which 
enables us to make reasonable guesses about some features of 
other people's appraisals when facts are in short supply. 
There is nothing comparable to this coherence where sensations 
are concerned. With sensations we are limited to the available 
evidence and cannot "work out" what the facts might be in quite 
the ,same way. But a knowledge of many sets of beliefs and 
values enables us to make reasonable conjectures about how a 
person will appraise a given situation once we know enough about 
them to have identified a few relevant beliefs. 
Very crude decisions about the beliefs and values people 
hold are made when we assign stereotypes to them. A stereotype 
of the Maori picks out certain sets of beliefs, habits and 
interests. Like a caricature, it highlights certain features 
which form a coherent pattern. These features which are picked 
out as characterising the Maori provide a very limited set of 
generalisations, each of which may be inadequate in particular 
cases since the instances upon which it is based may not be 
very representative. When we say that a person has a stereo-
type of representatives of a particular group we usually mean 
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that he has a picture of them which does not do them justice. 
Thus a stereotype of Maoris may be of beer-drinking, generous, 
happy-go-lucky, semi-literate producers of large families who 
care little for the future or the finer things of life. Since 
such a view might lead us to decide that we will not let our 
houses to such people or that they may be a bad employment risk, 
and since such a view would be pernicious if false, our claim 
that such a view is a stereotype is an expression of moral 
disapproval. Nevertheless the germ of an interpretive 
mechanism resides in such stereotypes for they point us toward 
aspects of situations which will be of concern to those people 
correctly picked out. We know that the Maori will be dis-
interested in the politician's plans for the future, care little 
for education, but be upset if his local pub runs dry. 
While the employment of stereotypes should be viewed with 
caution since through picking out some few features they provide 
an oversimplified framework for interpreting the complex 
behaviour of individuals, in addition to being built on weak 
foundations, this is not to argue that stereotypes should be 
eliminated from the interpretive repertoire of the rational man. 
For clearly when we approach complete strangers we must view 
them under some aspect if our actions toward them are to be 
considered ones, and a stereotype is perhaps all we can employ 
until we have acquired some body of facts about them which make 
a more complex framework possible. Thus we may assign stereo-
types on the basis of the colour of skin or language, manner of 
dress, carriage in social interaction, or vocation, age or sex. 
To be rational in the use of such generalisations about people, 
however, does require that their flimsiness be recognised, and 
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hence that they should not be employed in a rigid fashion or 
depended upon as more than a means of structuring the initial 
situation when facts are in short supply. Stereotypes are, 
of course, closely intermeshed with prejudices, and must be the 
subject of continual rational scrutiny. 
Stereotypes enable us to pick out certain sets of values 
and beliefs from amongst those which have been accumulated in 
a particular interpretive scheme. They also help us pick out 
particular sets of behavioural events from those which have 
become tagged to a particular emotion, since stereotypes often 
involve beliefs about conventional ways of expressing various 
feelings. We all know about the stiff upper lip of the 
Englishman, the demonstrativeness of the French, the inscruta-
bility of the Oriental, the melodrama of the socialite and the 
impassiveness of the chess player. And of course some stereo-
types suggest characteristic emotional dispositions - the 
passionate Latin, the dour Scot, the frustrated spinster, the 
temperamental artist. 
As more facts about an individual corne in, a number of 
stereotypes may seem appropriate and may serve to qualify 
features of each other so that a more complex picture of the 
other person's structure of beliefs and values becomes possible. 
When we are introduced to a young man at a party and are 
informed that he is a school teacher we are immediately able to 
draw together an interlocking set of beliefs which may be 
pertinent to our dealings with him - namely those beliefs 
concerning the beliefs and values of school teachers. But it 
is not as yet much of a guide since it will either be very 
general and hence the immediate guidance it can give will be 
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limited, or if our view of what teachers believe and value is 
a very detailed and particular view, we are liable, on anyone 
occasion, to be quite wrong. 
We may further identify our teacher as a young socialist, 
however - and believe that he will see education as a means of 
achieving social justice and equality. We might expect that 
his values would clash with those who wish to give state aid 
to private schools or who are indifferent to inadequacies in 
the education of the disadvantaged. But the stereotypes will 
also give some structure to our understanding of the ways in 
which he will view matters other than those concerning education. 
The "teacher" stereotype will be qualified by the "socialist" 
one and vice versa. Again, if we perceive him as a rugby 
enthusiast we will have some idea of some of the things which 
give him delight, and we would expect an issue over all-white 
rugby tours from South Africa to expose the relationship between 
his social values and those concerned with sport, for if his 
enthusiasm for rugby is very great we could expect a dissonance 
to arise between these sets of values. And of course any of 
these particular stereotypes may be further qualified as we 
see him to be a socialist of the Marxist stamp, or as holding 
a position slightly to the left of an English Liberal. 
As stereotypes become progressively qualified it is 
apparent that the concept of a stereotype ceases to bite upon 
the "aspect" under which we view the other person (except in so 
far as each new distinction we make falls under a stereotype 
until the force of the other qualifying factors is realised). 
Rather, we begin to elaborate a set of rules governing the way 
this person sees the world which is, as a coherent pattern, 
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unique. Such thorough knowledge of another person, acquired 
over some time., is knowledge of a complex scheme of rules and 
causes. Our understanding of this person's behaviour will 
still be dependent on certain distinctions we make, but these 
will not arise from expectancies based on poor empirical 
generalisations about people of certain types. 
ilStereotypes" should be distinguished from "role" here. 
A woman may, for example, be a housewife, a mother and a nurse. 
Each of these roles is logically distinct. One can be a nurse 
without ever being a mother, and vice versa. But the rules 
governing the concepts are so general as to permit a wide range 
of ways of legitimately performing each role. Two women can 
be performing the mother role while acting in accord with quite 
different sets of beliefs. Our knowledge of the one we know 
intimately will include an understanding of the way in which 
she views motherhood - of the structure of the beliefs which 
determine this view, of her habits and inclinations. With a 
woman we know less well (but know her to be a mother) we must 
fit her "mother role" behaviour to a stereotype which tells us 
"how mothers usually behave", "what mothers usually believe", 
until we are able to identify the specific rules she follows. 
Often, of course, we do not know people intimately in every 
sphere. We may be able to predict exactly how a workmate will 
appraise a situation connected with a business crisis for we 
may know all of his relevant dispositions, yet our ability to 
work out how he might appraise matters on the golf course may be 
severely limited to the point of a quite narrow stereotype 
(particularly if we know little about golf) . 
One way of seeing how stereotypes work is to look into a 
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situation where groups of people clash and outrage each other 
by their actions. Our stereotypes help us to pick out 
characteristic sets of beliefs which enable us to see how 
members of the two groups differ in their appraisal of what is 
going on. One thing which becomes clear is that certain events 
may callout certain beliefs which link up into significant 
combinations in the appraisal merely because the events occur 
together in the situation. No doubt these beliefs are related 
together in the individual's belief and value systems, but the 
juxtaposition of the events highlights relationships which on 
other occasions may not be very prominent. Belief set A may 
be intimately bound up with belief set B on this occasion. At 
another time the combination may be A and C with no element from 
B making a contribution. 
Recent developments arising from an annual event in 
Christchurch may serve to illustrate this. On ANZAC Day the 
veterans march to pay their respects to the war dead. On a 
number of occasions these ceremonies have led to the expression 
of strong feelings as young people have attempted to lay wreaths 
bearing placards protesting the death of civilians in Viet Nam. 
Veterans have cordoned off the Cenotaph, there have been 
scuffles in the Square and the issues have been extensively 
debated in the daily press. It is clear that many veterans 
have become outraged and angry, but what is it that they see 
when a youth attempts to make such a gesture? Individuals may 
see the situation in any number of ways, and to know how they 
feel would require considerable evidence concerning individual 
behaviour. Some of them may, for example, scuffle and protest 
in order to "liven up" their day. But there are certain common 
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elements in the statements of many of the people sufficient for 
us to make reasonable guesses about sets of beliefs which may 
be "characteristic". 
Firstly, and appropriately enough, the veterans may feel 
that the protest is an affront to thei~ memory of the dead, that 
the feelings of those who mourn should be respected, and that 
the whole concept of protest is out of place here. The question 
of the rights of the veterans in this matter may be in some 
doubt since the ceremony is an explicitly public matter on 
public ground. This issue has some bearing on the rationality 
of their emotion, but nevertheless some minimal case for the 
veterans' view can be granted since most of us wish to respect 
the feelings of those who mourn. 
'J 
But the occasion is not merely one of remembering the 
deaths of those with whom danger was shared. It is in a very 
particular context. The military and the ex-military are 
remembering the dead of a particular war which they believed 
(or at least a very large number of them now believe) that they 
fought to protect a way of life which was not only vital to them 
but to all mankind. This occasion then, is not only one of 
valuing the dead but of valuing and publicly acknowledging the 
value of a particular enterprise. A protest may be inappro-
priate in this context also - may be seen as being insufficiently 
respectful of the enterprise itself. In terms of both of 
these sets of beliefs any protest, including protests for more 
social security benefits for war widows, may evoke a negative 
response from war veterans. 'But still the cordons and the 
fig'hts point to something stronger. 
The veterans may see the protest as being in support of 
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the communists, and the communists as being the contemporary 
equivalent to the fascist they fought. To see the kind of 
parallel which the veterans might see, one must note such 
aspects of the two systems as the lack of free speech, the 
activities of the secret police and the general lack of liberty 
- factors which are supposedly antithetical to the way of life 
for which the veterans fought. The force of "anti-communism" 
as the aspect of appraisal becomes more convincing when it is 
remembered that historically the fear of communism and the cold 
war followed closely upon the heels of the fear of Nazis and 
the horror of the Second World War. In this light, to protest 
against the Viet Nam war is not only to show a lack of respect 
by protesting, but to directly assault the beliefs of the 
veterans. It is to betray the way of life that the contem-
poraries of the veterans fought and died for. It may be 
empirically false that the communists are a threat, that "the 
way of life" actually exists or even existed, or that the men 
really fought to defend it at the time. Yet whatever the truth 
about such beliefs, it would not be difficult to show how men 
might become firmly committed to them. 
Finally, the protestors are young. There are many ways 
in which this could be seen to have an effect (using a psycho-
analytic scheme like H.J. Pearson's we may see a conflict of 
t · h . d' ) 18 genera 10ns ere ln Freu lan terms • But there are some 
features of a way of seeing youth which directly link up with 
this situation. The veterans and their comrades fought to 
preserve a way of life for future generations. Here are young 
, H.Je, Adolescence and the Conflict of Generations, 
Norton and Co., N.Y., 1958. 
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people, not only showing a lack of interest in the struggles of 
that particular war, but apparently rejecting the way of life 
itself. They are perhaps members of that large group of young 
people who believe that the liberty and justice in the way of 
life for which the veterans fought was not as real as the 
veterans had been inclined to believe; that the way of life 
which the young had inherited from the previous generation was 
rotten and corrupt - that its particular vices were not perhaps 
very much worse than the vices peculiar to communist systems; 
and that in the light of this there could be no justification 
for bombing and displacing civilians in Viet Nam. In addition, 
the young may be seen as having "had it easy" - as having grown 
up in an affluent age and as having rejected things associated 
with that affluence without appreciating how difficult it was 
to achieve the good things which they take for granted. The 
veterans' generation had to struggle. 
These three areas of belief may link up. The rejection 
of the bombing and the displacing of civilians may (if commu-
nists and Nazis are seen in a similar light by the veterans) be 
seen as an attack on the actions performed on civilians by 
allied armies in the Second World War. This would be seen as 
an attack, not only on the value of the objectives of that 
enterprise but on the means employed to attain the objectives as 
well. Similarly, even the view that the protest fails to 
respect the feelings of those who wish to remember their 
comrades may link up with the attack on the way of life of the 
veterans - the young no longer respect even these old values (or 
so it would se!~rq,>. 
Thus whole patterns of beliefs can join to form a coherent 
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appraisal. Some of these beliefs are perhaps widely and 
readily understood (such as the wish that the feelings of the 
veterans be respected where their dead comrades are concerned). 
Others might not be so intelligible unless the conditions under 
which they were acquired are more clearly elaborated. It 
might be difficult for one born in the fifties, for example, to 
see why someone might fear communism to the extent that the fear 
would become such a major element in the calculus of the 
appraisal. To see what is involved here one may need to gain 
some idea of what it would be like to have lived through the 
cold war. The terror of communism manifested itself in a 
united Nations force in Korea, in McCarthyism in the united 
States, in a nuclear arms race, a missile race and a Bay of Pigs 
invasion. Hungary and Tibet were invaded and the world seemed 
to be under a continual war threat. The fear of communism 
which was common among so many of their parents may not be 
present in younger people who grew up in the years when confron-
tation was being displaced by increasing liaison between East 
and West. Young people who wish to understand how their 
elders appraise this situation need not only to take account of 
things of this kind, but may also need an interpretive scheme 
to help them understand both sides of the "conflict of genera-
tions ". Pearson's psychoanalytic account (which has already 
been referred to) would suggest that amnesia in respect of 
adolescence and a confrontation between a fading and a flowering 
sexuality might provide a set of conditions which would modify 
the appraisal of the middle-aged. 
A case of the sort which has been developed above would 
need to be further refined before we could use it to understand 
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the appraisal of any particular person, for one or a number of 
these sets may be absent where an individual is concerned, and 
the height of his passion may be determined by the importance 
to him of various of the values or combinations of values. 
At the beginning of this section it was suggested that stereo-
types provide only a crude means of making decisions about the 
kinds of beliefs and values an individual might hold. We need 
to be aware of the complexities of this matter of beliefs and 
values where individuals are concerned: of the effects on 
appraisals of differences too subtle for stereotypes to contend 
with. 
III Beliefs and Values 
Jim may believe that he has certain interpersonal rights 
(defined by sex) with respect to his wife. He may believe 
thqt her current behaviour is intended to capture another man's 
interest in order that she be seen by him as a sex object. 
And he may believe that the man is behaving in a way which 
indicates that such an interest has been captured. If he 
further believes that these actions performed by his wife and 
the other man infringe against his rights, and if his belief 
about rights is at all strongly held he must (logically) be 
jealous and behaviour predicated on such a set of beliefs would 
be so termed. A whole set of beliefs is involved here and it 
is only when they all come together that such an emotion can 
occur. Thus Jim must believe 
1. That he has certain interpersonal rights defined 
by sex concerning his wife. 
2. That certain pieces of behaviour on the part of his 
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wife toward other men, or of other men towards his 
wife may threaten these rights. 
3. That when this behaviour of his wife towards another 
man is responded to by a man in such a way as to be 
a threat to these rights, the two pieces of behaviour/ 
taken together, constitute a violation of these 
rights. 
4. That he has perceived an actual instance of 3. 
3 and 4 are crucial. If his wife acts in this particular 
way, perhaps by attempting to flirt at a party, and no other man 
responds to her attempts, Jim may be humiliated but he cannot be 
jealous. Again, if all of the conditions 1 to 3 are met but 
he fails to believe that he has been confronted with an instance 
of 3 (he is preoccupied by a crisis at work or the other man is 
his best friend) then he clearly cannot be jealous. 
At first sight it might seem that beliefs 2 to 4 are 
entailed in 1, since to have certain rights necessitates that 
certain actions constitute an infringement of them. Neverthe-
less, the mere belief that he has such rights does not in itself 
pick out any particular actions taken with certain intentions 
as being infringements of the rights. Thus belief 4 requires 
certain beliefs about what the people are actually doing, which 
involves beliefs about what they are intending. He may quite 
reasonably believe that when a man performs action A he intends 
X, whereas when another man performs action A he intends Y (or 
that a man may perform A on two occasions, intending X on one 
and Y on another). Thus his interpretation of the situation 
need not be entirely dependent on his belief about his rights, 
but may in part be determined by quite independent beliefs 
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concerning the relationship between other people's beliefs and 
their actions.. Thus to know how Jim feels when he is jealous 
as a consequence of his wife's flirtation at a party we must 
know what he believes his rights to be, and how he interprets 
her actions and the behaviour of those around her. And since, 
in a particular situation, this may involve more than a know-
ledge of a string of beliefs held by Jim we must be able to see 
how beliefs which do not have a logically necessary relationship 
do in fact structure an, appraisal of a coherent kind when events 
permit them to be linked up. 
It might be argued that the analysis does not capture 
"jealousy" since two people might perceive the same situation 
with respect to their wives, and whereas one is swept with 
jealousy the other is disturbed, but not nearly so profoundly 
moved. Certainly there is some sort of gap between this 
cognitive analysis of the emotion and its physiological mani-
festations. Yet the example itself does not support the argument 
to the extent that is superficially apparent. For when we 
spell out what would be required of two such men. were they to 
perceive the situation in the same way, it is plain that the 
case begins to sound rather strange. Firstly, we must assume 
that they believe the same things with respect to 1 to 3. 
Second, we may need to assume that they believe the same things 
regarding the intentions underlying the actions of other people. 
And finally, we must assume that the beliefs are held in the 
same way by the two men, and associated with the same values. 
Certain of our beliefs are held passionately - to abandon them 
would be to upset the fabric of our world (conservation of 
quantity, and causality, for example). Other beliefs are 
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relatively tentative and would be readily abandoned in the face 
of contrary evidence or argument. Thus a man may hold belief 
1 timidly and his appraisal of the party situation may be 
anxious, but not passionate. 
But even if he holds the belief .firmly, as a universal 
rule, he may not much care to exercise his right. His wife may 
have become abhorrent to him, and although he finds the whole 
business distasteful, the violation of his rights has less 
emotional force, being checked by other values and beliefs. 
Thus it would seem more plausible to argue that our two jealous 
men were not in fact appraising matters in the same way and 
that their similarities were more apparent than real. It is 
subtle differences of the sorts which have been outlined above 
which are not taken into account by the relatively crude 
distinctions which stereotypes permit. 
This chapter has been concerned with the construction of 
appraisals. 
may utilize. 
We must now look more closely at the evidence we 
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CHAPTER IV THE "FACTS" AND THEIR SOURCES 
It has been argued that the identification of an emotion 
experienced by another person depends upon our assessment of 
bits of his behaviour in the light of an interpretive scheme. 
This may consist, firstly, in a rule or set of rules which 
divide one emotion from another in a conceptual scheme, and 
secondly, in a set of behaviours and actions which may (but need 
not) be logically related to the rule or set of rules. Thus if 
John says that his brother has transgressed against his rights 
and that, because of this he would like to kick him in the shins, 
his statement conforms to the rules of the concept of "anger". 
The manner in which he thumps the table may also be related to 
the concept of "anger", but contingently so, for this action 
does not meet all of the logical requirements of the concept: 
it is possible to perform this act without being angry.. Yet 
"thumping the table" is included as a part of the framework for 
inferring anger since it has been seen to be a sufficiently 
characteristic action where anger occurs. Similarly, certain 
kinds of behaviour are logically incompatible with holding 
certain beliefs or values (burning the old masters you value very 
much when no other beliefs or values intrude to override those 
values) • Certain other pieces of behaviour are psychologically 
related to particular beliefs (blushing when you believe you 
have been caught out). Thus there are "facts" which fall under 
interpretive schemes and for which we can look, and which we can 
work together as a basis for constructing someone's appraisal. 
Also, rather importantly, the accumulation of these facts can, 
when related to each other and to our own experience, permit us 
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to build new interpretive schemes or add to the ones we have, 
and to refine our stereotypes. This chapter will be concerned 
with these "facts", the kinds of events one might attend to in 
the search for such facts, and the manner, specifically, in 
which the study of works of literature may enable us to acquire 
facts and improve our facility in working with them appro-
priately. 
We build interpretive schemes, unravel belief and value 
systems and flesh out stereotypes through attending to the 
manner in which we and others respond to the world we 
experience. The elements of such experience which we employ 
in practice may in the end be quite inappropriate, or our 
interpretations false, but there is no reason in principle why 
this should be so. In so far as we do have knowledge concerning 
other people's feelings in particular situations it must be 
buiit up from facts about our own feelings in the past, or 
facts deduced or inferred from the behaviour of others. These 
last facts may have been gathered from a wide variety of sources 
- not only from our confrontations with various people in the 
past or at second-hand, either through anecdotes, drama or 
literature (including biography and autobiography) but also 
through forms of investigation which are employed in a 
systematic fashion to consider human behaviour or factors 
influencing human behaviour (such as history, psychology, socio-
logy, anthropology or the medical sciences). Findings from 
such areas may be relevant in different ways, depending on the 
context and the type of feeling involved. 
There are many important distinctions which might be made 
between the sources of data which we may use to establish the 
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facts of the matter. There are differences, for example, 
between the evidence of our eyes and ears when we are confronted 
with someone in the grip of some feeling, and the evidence 
which is built up from the observations made by other people. 
Here we have not only the difficulty of the reliability of 
someone else's hearing and seeing, but also their ability to 
communicate to us whatever it is that they see and hear, and 
however they interpret it. 
I Sources of Facts 
Alasdair MacIntyre distinguishes utterances, which express 
emotions, from sentences and statements which report them. 
When I tell you what I feel I do not express the emotion, 
I report it. Or rather I mayor may not be expressing 
the emotion in the act of reporting it, but I am 
c~rtainly reporting it. This is partly a matter of to 
whom I am speaking. If I am angry with you and I say 
"I am angry with you", I am doubtless expressing my anger 
in the act of reporting it. But if I am angry with you 
and say to someone else "I am angry with Smith" then it 
would be odd to say that I was expressing my anger. It 
is, in any case, utterances and neither sentences nor 
statements that are expressive of emotion, and utterances 
may certainly stand to an emotion just as other behaviour 
stands to it. But what I say when I so utter does not 
stand in the same relationship to the emotion. - - -
Certainly I may so utter the sentence "I am angry" with 
clenched lips, gnashing teeth and all the conventional 
accompaniments of anger, whatever they are, in such a way 
that my utterance is an expression of my anger. But my 
utterance of "E=mc 2 " can be an expression of my anger in 
just the same way as my utterance of "I am angry".19 
Thus, "yes", "no" or "so" can be intoned in a variety of 
different ways to express different kinds of feeling. Far more 
subtle forms of expression occur in the choice of the words 
themselves - from the manner and style of speech. We frequently 
find examples of this in the "tone" of letters, where the 
19Maclntyre, A.C., "Behaviour, Belief and 
tions of Life and Mind, (ed.) Grene, M. 
Paul, London, 1971. Page 92. 
Emotion", Interpreta-
Routledge and Kegan 
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intonation is lacking. Evidence of feeling can even be gained 
sometimes from certain features of the content of statements 
even when they do not report a feeling. Disparagement is often 
used to infer envy. Repeated expressions of hope that misfor-
tune may befall someone may indicate hate. Recurrent defence 
of another person's actions, and praise of their virtues may 
be seen to reflect admiration, love, worship or devotion. And, 
of course, what is not said may, in some contexts,contribute 
to the evidence we call upon to support a claim to know how 
another person feels. Clearly such facts are frequently very 
ambiguous when the matter of correct interpretation arises, but 
this is a problem independent of the kinds of facts themselves. 
Other relevant kinds of observable behaviours range from 
physiological changes such as blushing, to actions performed or 
omitted. "Physiological changes" is a rather inadequate 
category, since even a smile involves some physiological change. 
What is meant is rather that some elements of behaviour indicate 
particular feelings without being expressions of them. A 
smile is usually seen as a form of expression - an "expression" 
being something which could have been otherwise, or could have 
been subjected to voluntary control. There are, however, some 
physiological changes which mark out feelings rather than 
express them. We can do little directly to control our heart-
beat, our perspiration, or the colour in our faces. Such 
physiological changes often seem to indicate certain kinds of 
sensations, and since sensations often accompany occurrent 
emotion (blushing and embarrassment) such indications may be 
relevant facts. Matters of movement and posture such as the 
dispirited slouch or the proud stance may also be important. 
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We may move with confidence, or fearfully. 
of indifference. 
We may make gestures 
Contextual information is often vital. The absence of 
certain pieces of behaviour may be significant in the light of 
the circumstances. Since he is suppo~ed to be in love with the 
girl, the fact that he is seeing very little of her now may 
suggest that his feelings have changed (or have her's changed?). 
If Mrs Jones really doesn't believe that anything has happened 
to her son, why doesn't she go out tonight as she had planned? 
In addition, the contextual facts mark out the other side of the 
appraisal coin, permitting us to see what the appraisal picks 
out. The construction of the appraisal is often a matter of 
an interaction between the behavioural and contextual facts. 
Once the foundations have been laid, the facts on one side 
permit more facts on the other to be picked out. 
Jim seems terrified. How do we know? We attend to him 
and see that our belief arises from the way he is staring. 
What is he terrified of? We look at the situation to see 
what he is staring at. What does he see to be scared of 
in that? We return to consider things we know about him 
from the past - what he has told us that he believes about 
things like that, or what he has shown us through his 
previous behaviour. 
- - - we waver back and forth between qualities of the 
object and what we know about Jim. 
II "Primary" and "Secondary" Facts 
The primary/secondary distinction has been made to 
facilitate a discussion of the differences between first- and 
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second-hand experience. The "primary" facts of John's feelings 
are obtained when we are confronted with John experiencing a 
feeling. We see his facial configuration, his posture, his 
movement; and we hear his statements and other utterances. 
The extent to which we are able to locate the facts when our own 
observations are at stake is largely dependent upon the 
appropriateness of the stereotypes and interpretive schemes we 
have developed, and on our ability to unravel the bases of our 
own appraisals. These features and memory are crucial in the 
task of distinguishing fact from falsehood and appropriate fact 
from inappropriate. Nevertheless, while we can more readily 
investigate the validity of our own observation, thecontribu-
tions of such observations to the kinds of knowledge we need if 
we are to know how another person feels is strictly limited by 
the lack of opportunity to observe in suitable ways a sufficiently 
wid~ range of people in emotional situations. 
"Secondary" facts are mediated by other people before they 
are available to our perception. Thus, when we are told by Jim 
how John reacted to the news, the knowledge of the facts about 
Jim will depend on the validity of Jim's interpretation of 
John's behaviour and Jim's ability to communicate his interpre-
tation to us as well as on the "primary" part - the validity of 
our interpretation of what Jim said. The vast bulk of our 
knowledge of the factors which influence the feelings of others 
is gained from what other people tell us. Much of it comes in 
the form of simplified rules and generalisations which can be 
fitted into our existing schemes, obviating the task of sifting 
the raw data of experience and linking it up to form the 
generalisations for ourselves. But much of this secondary 
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information is false. Can we recover the raw data through 
these secondary sources (even in principle)? And if not, upon 
what grounds may we validate this information? 
Jim may wish to impart certain information to us 
concerning John's feelings. If this information arrives in 
the form "John is angry", we have a secondary fact without any 
knowledge of the primary facts upon which it is based, and we 
have no way of checking whether or not Jim's interpretation is 
appropriate in terms of what there was to be seen or heard. 
Jim may, however, attempt to show us what the primary facts 
were. He may say that John frowned, clenched his teeth, 
thumped the table, said that such a thing could not be permitted. 
This still might not do, for in terms of the interpretive 
schemes we employ, the description may be as appropriate for 
"determination" as it is for "anger". But given that Jim has 
presented us with sufficient details of behaviour and context 
(John was not, for example, acting the fool) for us to agree 
that these pieces of behaviour, in the light of our interpretive 
scheme, should be seen as "angry", all that remains for us to 
consider, is whether the words he has used are correct descrip-
tions. Did John really frown, really thump? There are many 
disagreements which Jim and I might have over the appropriate 
description of a primary fact. When does a wince become a 
flinch? Was it a smile or a leer? A sneer or a wry grin? 
Although there are fuzzy areas between such concepts, 
there is less difficulty in settling such disagreements than is 
at first apparent. People who sneer and people who grin wryly 
are expressing different ways of viewing an incident in respect 
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to themselves. There is a difference of attitude or disposition 
which could be .settled by evidence from other sources (by asking 
them, for example). The problem of the secondary fact is not 
that it cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed in principle, but 
that the additional evidence is rarely available in practice. 
Once we are sure of the sincerity of the source of the 
secondary information its validation depends either on the 
extent to which the primary data can be made available to us, or 
on the extent to which we can rely upon the judgements of the 
secondary source. Such an assessment requires a knowledge of 
the rationality of the procedures employed by our source - its 
objectivity and the sophistication of the interpretive frame-
works available, and the consistency and appropriateness with 
which they are employed. Yet even when this information is 
lacking, we may still decide to believe that our source is 
reliable, simply because its information has been shown to be 
correct so very frequently in the past. We know that some 
people are very good at being able to sort out how people feel. 
There are of course some sources of secondary information 
which are open to public scrutiny, both in terms of the 
procedures employed and the actual data used. These are the 
highly developed, rationalised forms of enquiry such as social 
science, history and medical research. Since these forms of 
thought are concerned with the abstraction of generalisable 
findings from particular events it is vital that the manner in 
which such enquiries are conducted should be a public matter. 
Such studies are able to make important contributions to the 
construction and rationalisation of the interpretive scheme and 
the correction and elaboration of stereotypes, but clearly in 
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many particular situations we must depend upon the eyes and 
ears of our friends and acquaintances, who may not be familiar 
with the relevant fields. The restrictions imposed by the 
pressures of the occasion may mean that time is not available 
for the detailed setting out of data and procedure which make 
the status of the findings in these fields matters of public 
scrutiny. 
It should be plain then, that one of the steps we might 
take if we were to make a deliberate attempt to develop some-
one's ability to work out how another person feels would be to 
initiate him into the form and content of these modes of enquiry. 
But since the purpose of such studies is to unravel general laws 
and rules governing human behaviour and since the amount of 
personal contact with various people in emotional situations is 
severely limited by the restricted and painstaking manner in 
which such studies must be pursued, some way must be found of 
developing the ability to make sense of the kinds of primary 
information one has available in everyday life. It is usual 
to suggest the use of fiction in this connection, although as 
will be shown later, the suggestion brings with it a peculiar 
set of problems. 
The view has an obvious plausibility, for we seem to be 
able to claim without danger of serious question that many works 
of fiction represent emotional states and their contexts with 
considerable accuracy. To further demonstrate the value of 
this claim it is necessary to admit and leave to one side at 
this point the obvious fact that the emotional states and 
circumstances of characters in fiction are often distorted in 
the interests of art, morality or polemics away from what would 
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be probable in the real world. Nevertheless, actors in the 
drama attempt to express the feelings of their characters in a 
psychologically plausible manner, and playwrights and producers 
give context to the expression which can make some sense of it. 
If the links between behaviour, belief and context are based on 
a sufficiently sophisticated understanding, then to the extent 
that the behaviour is accurately reproduced in the play there 
will be a set of primary facts which can serve to inform those 
with interpretive schemes which are relatively naive, through 
showing how the physical activity of a person may give expres-
sion to his beliefs and values. 
III The Use of Fiction 
There are many problems, practical and theoretical, which 
would need to be resolved before we can launch into schools 
and use literature in an attempt to develop in our pupils the 
ability to work out the feelings of others. But before there 
is any point in trying to solve these problems it must be more 
clearly demonstrated that important features of the discussion 
in the last two chapters can be illustrated from works of 
literature. Dickens' Great Expectations will be used for this 
purpose. His narrator, Pip, passes through an emotional crisis 
when he begins a new life. 
So subdued I was by those tears, and by their breaking out 
again in the course of the quiet walk, that when I was on 
the coach, and it was clear of the town, I deliberated 
with an aching heart whether I would not get down when we 
changed horses and walk back, and have another evening at 
home, and a better parting. We changed, and I had not 
made up my mind, and still reflected for my comfort that it 
would be quite practicable to get down and walk back, when 
we changed again. And while I was occupied with these 
deliberations, I would fancy an exact resemblance to Joe 
in some man coming along the road towards us, and my heart 
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would beat high. - As if he could possibly be there! 
We changed again, and yet again, and now it was too late 
and too far to go back, and I went on. And the mists 
had all solemnly risen now, and the world lay spread 
before me. 20 
Pip is reporting on his own high emotional state in this 
passage. The things that we can actually learn here about his 
state are, however, rather limited. Another passenger on the 
coach would probably be able to see that he was agitated and 
upset. He might guess at one cause - Pip's leaving home. He 
might guess at the general focus of his concern - home and 
parents. We can learn a little more from the passage than 
could the other passenger, of course, for we have Pip's own 
report on his feelings. We know that one of his preoccupations 
was with Joe, and we know that Pip was not happy about the way 
he left home - that he was perhaps a little ashamed. There is 
not. much detail among the primary facts he reports, as there 
rarely is in novels (much detail of this sort impedes the 
action) . He is "subdued"; he "deliberates with an aching 
heart"; he fancies "an exact resemblance of Joe". These all 
involve or hint at appraisals, of things he thinks about and 
remembers. All of these involve a net of beliefs and values 
which are not made clear here. Beyond knowing that he is a boy 
upset by leaving home we know very little about Pip and the 
particular way in which he views this departure. 
Although there are few primary facts in this passage to 
enable us to understand this agitation which is distinctively 
Pip's, a reader of the whole novel will see far more here: will 
in fact see his appraisal rather clearly, for the agitation 
vJ~~U.O, C., Great Expectations, Penguin, 1965. Page 187. 
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arises from a tension between the things he values in the world 
he is leaving and the things he values in the world to which he 
travels. And these can be spelled out. Thus it would be 
possible to use such a novel as a means of investigating the 
relationship between a set of beliefs and values and the 
appraisals which might occur in a particular context. 
Pip had a very strong attachment to his brother-in-law 
Joe. He grew up in Joe's house and under his protection. 
But Joe was his companion and close friend - he did not take 
the role of a father, but was an equal. He protected Pip from 
his tyrannical sister and played games with him. They spent 
much time in each other's company. Pip loved Joe and 
treasured his good opinion. 
It was much upon my mind (particularly when I first saw 
him looking for his file) that I ought to tell Joe the 
whole truth. Yet I did not, and for the reason that I 
mistrusted that if I did, he would think me worse than 
I was. The fear of losing Joe's confidence, and of 
thenceforth sitting in the chimney-corner at night 
staring drearily at my for ever lost companion and friend, 
tied up my tongue. I morbidly represented to myself 
that if Joe knew it, I never afterwards could see him at 
the fireside feeling his fair whisker, without thinking 
that he was meditating on it. 21 
Joe was "a mild, good-natured, sweet-tempered, easy-going, 
foolish, dear fellow".22 
Young as I was, I believe that I dated a new admiration 
of Joe from that night. We were equals afterwards, as 
we had been before; but, afterwards at quiet times when 
I sat looking at Joe and thinking about him, I had a new 
sensation of feeling conscious that I was looking up to 
Joe in my heart. 23 
Ibid. 
22 Ibid . 
23Ibid . 
Page 72. 
Page 40. 
Page 80. 
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Feeling as he did about Joe, it can readily be appreciated 
that he would feel very upset when the time came to leave home 
(for whatever reason) • However, other aspects of his view of 
the world at that time enter to make his appraisal of his 
departure far more potent emotionally. For a long time there 
had been nothing which would have given him more pleasure than 
the prospect of being apprenticed to Joe and working in the 
forge. But he had become involved in the lives of a middle-
class family and was infatuated with Estella, the ward of the 
ageing Miss Havisham. His humble background and his coarseness 
bowed him down. The life that he aspired to conflicted with 
the life that he lived. Biddy, the simple good-natured girl 
who joined the household and had been his first teacher, became 
his confidant. Joe and Biddy were the people he loved, but 
their life was too coarse and common. He dreamt of being a 
gentleman and a match for Estella and was embarrassed by their 
simplicity. 
"Biddy," said I, after binding her to secrecy, "I 
want to be a gentleman." 
"Oh, I wouldn't, if I was yoU!1I she returned. "I 
don't think it would answer.1I 
"Biddy," said I with some severity, III have parti-
cular reasons for wanting to be a gentleman." 
"You know best, Pip,; but don't you think you are 
happiest as you are?1I 
"Biddy,1I I exclaimed, impatiently, "I am not happy 
as I am. I am disgusted with my calling and with my life. 
I have never taken to either, since I was bound. Don't 
be absurd. 1I 
"Was I absurd?" said Biddy, quietly raising her eye-
brows; III am sorry for that; I didn't mean to be. I 
only want you to do well, and to be comfortable." 
"Well then, understand once for all that I never 
shall or can be comfortable - or anything but miserable -
there, Biddy! - unless I can ~ad a very different sort of 
life from the life I lead now. 11 
"That's a pity!" said Biddy, shaking her head with 
a sorrowful air. - - -
"If I could have settled down," I said to Biddy, 
plucking up the short grass within reach, - - "if I could 
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have settled down and been half as fond of the forge as 
I was when I was little, I know it would have been much 
better for me. You and I and Joe would have wanted 
nothing then, and Joe and I would perhaps have gone 
partners when I was out of my time, and I might have grown 
up to keep company with you, and we might have sat on this 
very bank on a fine Sunday, quite different people. I 
should have been good enough for you; shouldn't I, 
Biddy?iI 
Biddy sighed as she looked at the ships sailing on, 
and returned for answer, "Yes; I am not over-particular." 
It scarcely sounded flattering, but I knew she meant well. 
"Instead of that," said I, plucking up more grass 
and chewing a blade or two, "see how I am going on. Dis-
satisfied, and uncomfortable, and - what would it signify 
to me, being coarse and common, if nobody had told me 
so ' " 
. 24 
Then, miraculously and mysteriously he was endowed with 
the means of becoming a gentleman. It seemed to him that Miss 
Havisham was the source of his expectations, and that she meant 
him to have Estella. He loved Joe. But Joe would not do as 
he was. Pip was to be a man of position, and he had a parti-
cular view of what such a man should be like, how he should carry 
himself, and who he should know (a set of beliefs of a very 
"snobbish" variety). 
"And it is, Biddy," said I, "that you will not omit 
any opportunity of helping Joe on, a little." 
"How helping him on?" asked Biddy, with a steady 
sort of glance. 
"Well! Joe is a dear good fellow - in fact, I 
think he is the dearest fellow that ever lived - but he is 
rather backward in some things. For instance, Biddy, 
in his learning and his manners." 
Although I was looking at Biddy as I spoke, and 
although she opened her eyes very wide when I had spoken, 
she did not look at me. 
"Oh, his manners! won't his manners do, then?" 
asked Biddy, plucking a black-currant leaf. 
"My dear Biddy, they do very well here _" 
"Oh! they do very well here?" interrupted Biddy, 
looking closely a~the leaf in her hand. 
"Hear me out - But if I were to remove Joe into a 
higher sphere, as I shall hope to remove him when I fully 
come into my property, they would hardly do him justice."25 
Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
Page 154. 
Page 175. 
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Pip had new clothes made and prepared to leave for London. 
He did not wish to be seen dressed in his new finery, but 
accompanied by his friends. 
I was leaving the village at five in the morning, carrying 
my little hand-portmanteau, and I had told Joe that I 
wished to walk away all alone. . I am afraid - sore 
afraid - that this purpose originated in my sense of the 
contrast there would be between me and Joe, if we went to 
the coach together. I had pretended with myself that 
there was nothing of this taint in the arrangement; but 
when I went up to my little room on this last night, I 
felt compelled to admit that it might be so, and had an 
impulse upon me to go down again and entreat Joe to walk 
with me in the morning. I did not. 26 
He burst into tears on his walk into town (the tears 
referred to in the initial extract), and afterwards was "more 
sorry, more aware of (his) own ingratitude, more gentle". 
And so it is apparent that Pip was not upset merely as a 
boy might have been on leaving the places where he grew up. 
He was caught in a conflict between the two sets of values 
which had come to lie at the very centre of his life. It is 
also clear that the occasion of this burst of emotion was the 
occasion of a new self-appraisal; an awareness of the manner in 
which his thoughts had betrayed the love of his friend. It was 
perhaps a minimal self-awareness, for Pip was inclined to avoid 
the implications of many of his actions and to explain away his 
less laudable motives. But here for a moment he could see, at 
least partially, what he had done. He would have liked to 
have had another evening at home "and a better parting". 
This discussion of the incident in Great Expectations when 
Pip leaves horne should serve to illustrate the manner in which 
literature might be used in education when attempts are made to 
id. Page 185. 
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improve students' facility in knowing how other people feel. 
A more precise knowledge than is possible when the emotional 
content of a situation in a novel is viewed in isolation can 
be gained by searching back for evidence of beliefs and values 
giving a more particular structure to the appraisals involved. 
This is essentially the same procedure we must employ when we 
attempt to make sense of someone else's feelings in everyday 
life. Sometimes it is necessary to draw isolated facts together 
into explanations. Occasionally we are presented with ready-
made explanations which have been put together by other people, 
although sometimes these have been assembled for occasions which 
only resemble that with which we are immediately concerned and 
hence the fit may be incomplete. An illustration of these 
points can be found again in Great Expectations, when Miss 
Havisham suggests to Pip that he love Estella. 
Then, Estella being gone and we two left alone, she 
turned to me, and said in a whisper: 
"Is she beautiful, graceful, well-grown? Do you 
admire her?" 
"Everybody must who sees her, Miss Havisham. 1I 
She drew an arm round my neck, and drew my head 
close down to hers as she sat in the chair. "Love her, 
love her, love her! How does she use you?" 
Before I could answer (if I could have answered so 
difficult a question at all), she repeated, "Love her, 
love her, love her! If she favours you, love her. If 
she wounds you, love her! If she tears your heart to 
pieces - and as it gets older and stronger, it will tear 
deeper - love her, love her, love her!" 
Never had I seen such passionate eagerness as was 
joined to her utterance of these words. I could feel 
the muscles of the thin arm around my neck, swell with 
the vehemence that possessed her. 
"Hear me, Pip! I adopted her to be loved. I bred 
her and educated her, to be loved. I developed her into 
what she is, that she might be loved. Love her!" 
She said the word often enough, and there could be 
no doubt that she meant to say it; but if the often 
repeated word had been hate instead of love - despair -
revenge - dire death - it could not have sounded from her 
lips more like a curse. 
72 
"I'll tell you," said she, in the same hurried 
passionate whisper, "what real love is. It is blind 
devotion, unquestioning self-humiliation, utter submis-
sion, trust and belief against yourself and against the 
whole world, giving up your whole heart and soul to the 
smiter - as I did!" 
When she came to that, and to a wild cry that 
followed that, I caught her round the waist. For she 
rose up in the chair, in her shroud of a dress, and struck 
at the air as if she would as soon have struck herself 
against the wall and fallen dead. 27 
For Miss Havisham, falling in love was a disaster - she 
gave up her heart and soul to. the smiter. To exhort Pip to love 
Estella was, then, to wish him ill. But why should she wish 
him to corne to harm? We will search in vain in the novel for 
any reason or cause for this attitude to Pip other than that he 
is a male who happens to stand in a certain relationship to 
Estella. Why should we think that Pip's maleness evokes in 
Miss Havisham a desire to crush him? Herbert explained to Pip 
why he believed that Miss Havisham wished to "wreak revenge on 
all the male sex". 
"Miss Havisham, you must know, was a spoilt child. 
Her mother died when she was a baby, and her father denied 
her nothing. Her father was a country gentleman down in 
your part of the world, and was a brewer. - - - Well! 
Mr Havisham was very rich and very proud. So was his 
daughter." 
"Miss Havisham was an only child?" I hazarded. 
"- - - No, she was not an only child; she had a 
half-brother. Her father privately married again - his 
cook, I rather think. - - - He married his second wife 
privately, because he was proud, and in the course of time 
she died. When she was dead, I apprehend he first told 
his daughter what he had done, and then the son became 
part of the family, residing in the house you are 
acquainted with. As the son grew a young man, he turned 
out riotous, extravagant, undutiful - altogether bad. 
At last his father disinherited him; but he softened when 
he was dying and left him well off, though not nearly so 
well off as Miss Havisham. 
Miss Havisham was now an heiress, and you may suppose 
was looked after as a great match. Her half-brother 
had now ample means again, but what with debts and what 
d. Page 261. 
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with new madness wasted them most fearfully again. There 
were stronger differences between him and her, than there 
had been between him and his father, and it is suspected 
that he cherished a deep and mortal grudge against her, 
as having influenced the father's anger. - - -
There appeared on the scene - say at the races, or 
the public baths, or anywhere else you like - a certain 
man, who made love to Miss Havisham. I never saw him, 
for this happened five-and-twenty years ago -, but I have 
heard my father mention that he was a showy-man, and the 
kind of man for the purpose. - - - This man pursued 
Miss Havisham closely, and professed to be devoted to her. 
I believe she had not shown much susceptibility up to that 
time; but all the susceptibilities she possessed certainly 
came out then, and she passionately loved him. There is 
no doubt that she perfectly idolized him. He practised 
on her affection in that systematic way, that he got great 
sums of money from her, and he induced her to buy her 
brother out of a share in the brewery (which had been 
weakly left him by his father) at an immense price, on the 
plea that when he was her husband he must hold and manage 
it all. Your guardian was not at that time in Miss 
Havisham's councils, and she was too haughty and too much 
in love to be advised by anyone. Her relations were poor 
and scheming, with the exception of my father; he was 
poor enough, but not time-serving or jealous. The only 
independent one among them, he warned her that she was 
doing too much for this man, and was placing herself too 
unreservedly in his power. The marriage day was fixed, 
the wedding tour was planned out, the wedding guests were 
invited. The day came, but not the bridegroom. He 
wrote her a letter - - _" 
"Which she received,1I I struck in, "when she was 
dressing for her marriage? At twenty minutes to nine?" 
"At the hour and the minute," said Herbert, nodding, 
"at which she afterwards stopped the clocks. - - -
When she recovered from a bad illness that she had, she 
laid the whole place waste as you have seen it, and she 
has never since looked upon the light of daY." 28 
These incidents would serve to give some explanation of 
Miss Havisham's desire for revenge upon males. But she did not, 
of course, set out systematically to hurt men. The few who 
came and went in her life were not treated in a manner 
remarkably different from the way in which women were treated. 
Pip appears at times to have been acknowledged with some favour. 
Why then this outburst; this visiting of revenge upon Pip? 
The key appears to lie in the relationship between Pip and 
Page 203. 
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Estella. Pip was sent to play at Miss Havisham's house when 
he was very young. He and Estella grew up together. It seems 
likely that Miss Havisham relived her tragic romance through the 
pair, but with this difference, that as time went on she 
schooled Estella in the art of breaking hearts. She did not 
attempt to take revenge on every man, but on the man who would 
court her. She saw herself as Estella to such an extent that 
she failed to see how Estella was actually developing. She saw 
Pip sometimes as he was, but at other times (as in the passage) 
as an object of revenge. At a climactic episode when Estella 
was explaining that she could never feel love, Miss Havisham saw 
the extent and the effect of her misperceptions, and she was 
filled with remorse. 
Herbert's explanation is thus inadequate on its own. 
To make a case along the lines of this argument for the view of 
Pip which Miss Havisham may have had, it would be necessary to 
trace in detail the development of the relationship between the 
three, and to employ an interpretive scheme which would link 
the tragic occasion in the past with the various identifications 
- Miss Havisham with Estella, and Pip with the false lover. 
This section has served to show that many of the conside-
rations which apply in everyday life in respect of knowing how 
other people feel also apply if we attempt to work out the 
feelings of characters in fiction. Clearly such a discussion 
could be pursued much further. What, for example, of the 
status of the information available to us in fiction? There 
are limits to the me<;isures we. can take to ensure that we have 
the facts since we are limited to what can be found in the work 
itself. Also, there are differences between a first-person 
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narrative like Great Expectations and a third-person one 
employing an eye-of-God technique. The validity of the infor-
mation in the latter case is, by definition, beyond question; 
but is Pip's account to be trusted? We could pursue this 
further by seeking out Pip's inconsistencies, by showing where 
he is less than frank (and why he might be so) and by unravel-
ling his beliefs and prejudices about other people. It is 
plain, for example, that he misjudges Miss Havisham's intentions, 
that his snobbishness for some time warps his view of Magwitch, 
and that his infatuation for Estella prevents him from seeing 
how she must lead her life. 
Still, we do not, in thus working out a fictional 
character's feelings, completely solve the educational problem 
of filling the gap between studies useful for developing the 
more general interpretive schemes or elaborating stereotypes 
and belief systems, and studies which can help students to come 
to terms with the grit and grain of behaviour in immediate 
situations. The kind of fiction which has already been 
described (the novel) rarely contains primary facts which the 
reader can assess - direct speech and interior monologue are 
two of the few exceptions, and in the former case much of the 
quality (intonation) is lacking. We are confronted with a 
situation already interpreted either through the eye-of-God; 
or through the eye of the narrator, and the information very 
frequently reaches us in a descriptive form far removed from the 
details of the facial contortion or quality of voice and move-
ment upon which the interpretation is based. There are, 
however, areas of fiction which can give observers more direct 
experience of these things. 
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IV Dramatic Fiction 
The particular point of drama rests on those things which 
can be expressed through human action in addition to the purely 
verbal. Drama can employ intonation, facial expression and 
movement. The audience for the most.part is confronted with 
the primary facts of the matter, vastly extending that which is 
available through dialogue in a novel. To be sure the 
behaviour which manifests itself on the stage may be grossly 
distorted for artistic (or dramatic) reasons. Nevertheless, 
where some sort of social realism is essential to the drama, 
and where we are required to work out a character's feelings by 
the way in which he acts, it is essential that the behaviour 
links up or can be made to link up with existing interpretive 
schemes. Drama can surely provide considerable educational 
opportunity to observe the behaviour of different people under 
different conditions in situations where the behaviour is 
considered important and distractions can be paired down to a 
minimum. 
The quality of acting is thus a vital consideration. 
Acting which is shoddy or psychologically implausible will fail 
to give the appropriate experiences. Educators must necessarily 
pay close critical attention not only to the psychological 
appropriateness of expressions of feeling in fiction used for 
these educational purposes, but also to acting quality. A good 
case could be made for exposing pupils to films which have been 
compiled from significant performances by proficient actors. 
Film, television and intimate drama would perhaps be preferable 
to the traditional theatre behind a proscenium arch where 
behavioural exaggeration is required merely to overcome the 
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problem of distance between actor and audience. Film and 
television have very great potential, since close-ups can always 
reduce the problem of distance, and the eye of the camera can 
force attention to those features which are important in a 
particular interpretive scheme. 
Although it has been demonstrated in this section that 
literature can illustrate the important features of procedures 
we might employ when we attempt to know how another person feels, 
it is not clear that we should use literature for this purpose 
in educational programmes. It would corne as no surprise for 
us to learn that an enthusiast for the teaching of literature 
in schools had become somewhat perturbed by the direction this 
thesis seems to have taken. "Let us take literature", the 
argument suggests, "and use it to develop certain skills and 
understandings which will assist the moral education of our 
pupils" • This enthusiast will not unnaturally want to be shown 
that such a development will in no way hinder a literary educa-
tion, and that literature teaching does not slowly get pushed 
out of the literature period as moral education creeps in. He 
may argue that the purposes of this thesis could be served by 
using works of little literary merit but which contain useful 
information about people's feelings. 
A consideration of this question will require that we turn 
, 
our attention to the problems of literary value and the signifi-
cance for literary experience of the mental states of characters 
in works of fiction. This will permit an understanding of the 
purposes of literary criticism and of the constraints which the 
nature of literature imposes upon the procedures critics employ. 
Such an understanding will be superficial but sufficient for us 
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to make some decisions about the incompatibility of these 
procedures with those outlined in Chapters III and IV, and to 
assess the merit of our enthusiast's suggestion. 
It should be pointed out that, although it may become 
apparent that literature can make a far greater contribution to 
moral education than the development of the ability to know how 
other people feel, no explicit case will be made for a more 
extensive use in this th~sis. The more limited case being 
argued here merely depends on literature's fundamental concern 
with human affairs. 
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CHAPTER V LITERATURE AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF 
OTHER PEOPLE'S FEELINGS 
I The Value of Art 
We must begin our consideration of literature by making 
some distinctions with respect to the concepts of "art" and 
"aesthetic". This is always a worrying task since people seem 
to so readily disagree over what art is. Critics do not 
concern themselves with finding philosophically satisfying 
definitions of "art" or "literature", but "get on with the job" 
instead. But their "job" does not seem to conform with the 
usual conceptions of knowledge-seeking activities. It is not 
philosophical, and it does not seem very similar to the more 
clearly empirical enquiries. Unlike the "job" of the scientist, 
it is not the critic's concern to accumulate theoretical know-
ledge about the world or to refine procedures employed to this 
end. Notions of "progress" in the two fields are radically 
different. What counts as good art or appropriate procedure 
in one age may be abandoned in the next, but then be brought 
back into prominence on some future occasion in a modified form. 
This difference from other forms of rational enquiry can, of 
course, be explained, and it need not mean, as some are inclined 
to think, that the logical structure of the field and the 
justification of its procedures must remain elusive to philo-
sophers, and hence suspect. 
But theories of art do seem to differ from each other 
rather radically. One of the reasons for this may centre on 
the part which feelings are seen to play. Works of art are 
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sometimes said to express the feelings of their creators. It 
also seems to be assumed sometimes that we should, through the 
work of art, experience something like the feelings which have 
been experienced by the artist and which he has attempted to 
express. Yet again, sometimes philosophers speak as though the 
correct response to art is an "aesthetic" one - by which they 
mean a particular kind of emotion such as a man might feel for 
a beautiful mountain or a sunset. Works of art, they seem to 
say, are just man-made versions of things to respond to in this 
way_ Although few now talk of special "aesthetic emotions" the 
sense of this is still present in much of the language. And 
finally, theorists speak as though there is something to be 
gained from art apart from the reproduction of an artist's 
feelings, or the satisfaction one gains from contemplating 
something beautiful - that there is some knowledge to be gained, 
some wisdom about the world. 
There is truth in all of these positions, yet many formu-
lations of art theories emphasise one or more at the expense of 
others and fail to show how they all may contribute. There is 
a tendency for the feelings of the artist to receive undue 
emphasis. This tendency may, in part, arise from a misunder-
standing of the relationship between the emotions which underly 
the production of a work of art and the emotional experiences 
we have when we confront it. It is often assumed that the 
artist expresses feelings, and that we can participate in his 
emotional experiences when we come to terms with the work. 
Now it is true (as has been shown in previous chapters) that we 
can come to know what a person feels by means of his emotional 
expression, but as a view of art it becomes absurd if we reduce 
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art to a sophisticated means of access to the emotions of 
another man. The germs of art are no doubt to be found in the 
emotional experiences of artists, and the motivation to produce 
art may also arise out of particular emotions. Certainly 
artists sometimes seem to recreate an emotional response they 
have had by setting out the kinds of conditions from which a 
comparable appraisal may be reconstructed, and by describing 
thoughts or sensations. Thus, for example, a love poem can be 
seen as expressing feelings of love. It is not surprising 
that in such cases the relationship between the experience of 
the artist and the response of the viewer should be seen as 
very direct. We seem to be caught up in the artist's feelings. 
But in many works the feelings of the men who made them are not 
so nakedly exposed. Can we reasonably suggest that in Macbeth 
the feelings of Shakespeare are expressed - can we, that is, 
pick out particular things he felt? If we agree that a person 
who views a particular passage correctly must feel despair, do 
we commit ourselves to saying that Shakespeare expressed despair 
here - a despair that he felt? Clearly not. Of course, when 
we say that he expressed despair, we may mean that he expressed 
thoughts or ideas about despair, but on the one hand this does 
not seem to capture what people who talk about artistic expres-
sion seem to be trying to say, and on the other hand it is very 
frequently a poor description of what confronts us in the work, 
since the material to be found in such cases so often seems to 
have been assembled to arouse some emotion in us, not to 
describe or explain it. Thus we will be misled if we permit 
the "art as expression" notion to encourage the view that the 
correct response to a work of art is to be measured in terms of 
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certain mental events of the artist. 
From the point of view of appreciating works of art (the 
aspect with which a critic is concerned), it may be more useful 
to view them as "evoking" emotions rather than as "expressing" 
them. (We cannot, of course, assume this view so readily 
where the production of art is concerned.) Feelings are evoked 
by works of art through a display of elements of situations 
which commonly lead to certain kinds of appraisals, by calling 
up traditional associations, or those underlying much of human 
experience and worked upon by certain colours, rhythms, tones 
or pitches. The response to a work of art depends upon a host 
of additional cognitions - matters of memory, comparison and 
interpretation. Even a brief survey of criticism of important 
plays or novels will reveal that sensitive appraisals make 
considerable intellectual demands. One must have sophisticated 
competencies and much information to see the point. When we 
say that art is concerned with feelings where science and 
history are concerned with facts we are pointing out very crudely 
that the function of art is to produce a response. When we use 
something as a work of art we use it as something to be moved by 
in some way. Criticism is concerned with showing the value of 
objects worthy of consideration as art by showing how they 
should appropriately be viewed. 
We use art, then, to perform some perceptual "work" upon 
USi to be attended to so that it may move us. And it is 
important to note that our response is not just "to the work of 
art" but "to the work of art in the light of our experiences". 
Even abstract art works this way. 
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What is the purpose of these differing shapes? We may 
say that all of them, each in its own way, attempts to 
make us experience through forms and colours the 
behaviour of basic patterns of forces .characteristic of 
what happens inside and outside of us all. - - - Once 
such patterns of forces have been discovered to be the 
carriers of expression in traditional art, we realize 
that they are not dependent upon the representation of 
objects. The Japanese wave may vanish, but its sweep 
may remain. To be sure, we give up a powerful means of 
expression when we abandon the so-called subject matter 
in painting and sculpture, and there is reason to believe 
that in the long run we shall not wish to put up with 
the loss. But there is also a gain in the purity of 
form and the directness of expression which has often been 
compared, somewhat loosely, with the pure sounds of music. 
Be this as it may, abstract art surely resembles all 
other art in that it, too, makes statements about reality 
and that in these statements reside its meaning and its 
justification· 29 
Nevertheless, we do not consider as art everything which 
is made by men with the intention that it "move" us. There is 
the question of aesthetic satisfaction. Beardsley argues that 
the goodness in which we take an interest (when our 
interest is aesthetic) is something that arises out of 
the ingredients of the poem itself; the ways its verbal 
parts - its structure and texture - combine and cooperate 
to make something fresh and novel emerge. The words have 
to work on us. They work by manipulating our under-
standing of things not in the parts. Heterogeneous 
words, improbably yoked, make suddenly a metaphor, and 
something is meant there that was never meant before. 
The names and verbs strung together concresce into a story, 
with dramatic tensions and resolutions. Regional 
qualities play on the surface - wit, or tenderness, or 
elation. Themes and theses rear up to be contemplated. 30 
Nearly everyone will agree, he feels, that the aesthetic 
experience displays the following features: 
First, an aesthetic experience is one in which attention 
is firmly fixed upon heterogeneous but interrelated 
components of a phenomenally objective field - visual or 
im, R., "What is Art For?", Aesthetics and Problems of 
Education, (ed.) Smith, R.A. University of Illinois Press, 
London, 1971. Page 241. 
30Beardsley, M., The Possibility of Criticism, Wayne State 
University Press, Detroit, 1970. Page 734. 
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auditory patterns, or the characters and events in litera-
ture. - - - Second, it is an experience of some 
intensity. Some writers have said that it is an 
experience pervasively dominated by intense feeling or 
emotion, but these terms occupy a dubious position in 
psychological theory; what we call emotion in an aesthetic 
experience may be simply the intensity of the experience 
itself. - - - (Thirdly) it is an experience that hangs 
together, or is coherent, to an unusually high degree. 
- - - Fourth, it is an experience that is unusually 
complete in itself. The impulses and expectations aroused 
by elements within the experience are felt to be counter-
balanced or resolved by other elements within the 
experience, so that some degree of equilibrium or finality 
is achieved and enjoyed. 31 
While there is no doubt that the quality of the aesthetic 
experience is what we look to when we try to assess the value 
of a piece of art, there is a tendency for our attention to the 
formal elements (unity, coherence, certain "regional qualities") 
to lead us to overlook the fact that these formal qualities are 
the qualities of a treatment of a certain content. What tends 
to be ignored is that the experience is linked with a content 
which is valued in certain ways. Arnheim says that art "makes 
statements about reality", but many of the statements which 
could be made would be singularly uninteresting. Art deals 
with things that are matters of particular human concern, or it 
reveals a way of looking at something usually considered of no 
importance so that we come to see that there is more to it than 
we had been inclined to think. Trivial works could be produced 
which would be unified, coherent and complete, but it is not 
possible that they could occasion that absorption - the 
"experience of some intensity" which is characteristic of art. 
A critic identifying a great work is saying in effect that no 
ley, M., Aesthetics, Harcourt, Brace and Co., N.Y., 
1958. Page 527. 
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educated man who properly understands this piece can remain 
unmoved. 
The intensity of the experience is linked to the fact that 
the object is able to hold our attention. "The concentration 
of the experience can shut out all the. negative responses -
the trivial dist~acting noises, organic disturbances, thoughts 
of unpaid bills and unwritten letters and unpurged embarrass-
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ments - that so often clutter up our pleasures." Now it is 
true that aesthetic experiences arise from natural phenomena 
which capture our attention so completely - sunsets, patterns 
in the sand, rainbows, the colours of oil on water, weathered 
rock and grotesque driftwood. But it is interesting that we 
do not slavishly imitate these things or collect, comment on 
and otherwise value them as we do works of art. We do not 
treat art works as man-made reconstructions of natural objects. 
Art works are of special value because they treat matters of 
particular human concern. The experiences which works of art 
make possible are considered worthy of man's attention, not just 
because they are pleasurable, but because they facilitate the 
acquisition of valued knowledge and understanding. 33 These 
two values ("aesthetic" and lithe contribution to knowledge and 
understanding") are, it should be emphasised, both values which 
are essential to the relative worth of a piece of art as art 
(rather than as, perhaps, an economic proposition). Both should 
be present in the proper consideration of a work, and both have 
Ibid. Page 528. 
33Jenkins, I., "Aesthetic Education and Moral Refinement", 
Aesthetics and Problems of Education, op.cit. Jenkins does 
not mention "Knowledge" or "Understanding" specifically. 
"We absorb this content into our catalogs of familiarity, 
refer it to the subject matter from which the artist 
derived it, and so enrich our acquaintance with this 
region of life and the world." Page 194. 
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an important part to play in determining the logical structure 
within which the procedures of criticism develop. 
The elements which are picked out by the second value are 
not logically independent bf the elements picked out by 
I 
aesthetic values (as may be, say, the elements picked out by 
this value as against economic value). Clearly the intensity 
with which we attend to the work is tied up with the particular 
human concern of the content, and its value as an experience 
which will facilitate the acquisition of certain knowledge and 
understanding is in part dependent upon such things as its 
coherence, unity, intensity - in short, its aesthetic quality. 
Thus, when we criticise works of art we attend to the way in 
which these elements are wedded. Yet we must justify the 
aesthetic value of art and the value of its contribution to 
knowledge and understanding in different ways. 
II Art, Experience and Knowledge 
,Dewey pointed up the relationship between experience and 
knowledge and the importance of the latter to education. He 
also showed us the critical relationship between art and 
. 34 An understanding of these relationships seems exper1ence. 
crucial to the kinds of enterprises with which educational 
philosophers are concerned, and further attention to them might 
serve to shed light on questions of educational procedures as 
well as on the problem of the nature of the aesthetic mode of 
enquiry. The argument in this chapter would be aided cons ide-
rab1y if the view that one of the critical values of art is the 
Dewey, J., Experience and Education, Collier Books, N.Y., 
1938. Art as Experience, Capricorn Books, N.Y., 1934. 
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"facilitation of the acquisition of knowledge and understanding" 
is seen to have some persuasive force. The view is, however, 
one which needs to be looked at more closely, since it is not 
the kind of claim which has received much direct attention. 
It is more usual for philosophers to be concerned with the 
apparent epistemological inadequacy of art, rather than with the 
relationship between knowledge and the experiences which art 
can provide. Some attempt will be made, then, to indicate what 
the manner of such a "facilitation" might be. 
There is a short-story by Frank Sargeson called Cow-pats 
35 
which will usefully illustrate this argument. It concerns a 
change in values which occurs in the life of a young boy. In 
a time of some economic difficulty (during the depression, 
perhaps) he and his brothers had to get up early and milk the 
cows. They had no boots and the ground was frosty. One of 
them discovered that he could warm his feet by standing in a 
fresh cow-pat, and soon all of them would race to warm their 
feet whenever a cow dropped one. The first boy there would 
keep the others out. Although times were hard "we didn't think 
we were hardly done by. As I've said, we didn't know any other 
sort of life". 
One season he went with his mother while she had a week's 
rest at an uncle's hotel, and when he returned he wouldn't use 
cow-pats again. His brothers "reckoned I thought I'd come back 
from town a bit too flash for a trick like that. That wasn't 
the reason, though". In the mornings he had played around the 
entrance to the hotel, asking. the porter who washed the steps 
Sargeson, F., "Cow-pats", Collected Stories, Blackwood, 
Auckland, 1964. 
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why he was doing various things, and rarely getting satisfactory 
answers. 
Then one morning just as the porter was finishing the 
steps an old man came along the street and asked if he 
could warm his hands up in the bucket of water. The 
porter said, Sure, so the old man put his hands in the 
water and kept them there until ~hey were warm. 
Well, that was something I understood without having to 
ask any questions. Perhaps it's stopped me from asking 
a good many questions in my life. I believe it's correct 
to say you get the best answers out of life if you don't 
ask any questions. 
Of course, after so many years I don't look at it in quite 
the same way. While you're alive you naturally want to 
keep yourself warm, and it doesn't matter much how you do 
it. But at that age to see an old man who might be glad 
of a few cow-pats to warm himself up in was somehow a bit 
much for me. 36 
This story moves and strangely puzzles. It moves us 
particularly because these two experiences are closely related 
and yet they conflict emotionally. Initially we come to see 
that the second experience can be understood in terms of the 
first. It has been explained in an earlier chapter of this 
thesis that we can understand how another person feels by 
imagining certain of our own experiences modified by his situa-
tion. At first sight the match between the experiences of the 
narrator and the old man seems so close that one would expect 
that the narrator may "understand" to the point of empathising. 
Being cold and finding such simple relief are common elements 
picked out by the narrator for us to notice. Both the narrator 
and the reader understand the second experience in terms of the 
first - "Well, that was something I understood without having to 
ask any questions". 
But if we view this story as simply depicting human under-
Ibid. Page 65. 
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standing in terms of certain relationships between the features 
of two experiences, certain contradictions will remain. For 
when our narrator returned home "I turned up my nose at those 
cow-pats, and wouldn't put my feet in one no matter how cold it 
was" • And then "after so many years I don't look at it in 
quite the same way. While you're alive you naturally want to 
keep yourself warm, and it doesn't matter much how you do it". 
That, we would have thought, if we were concerned to see the 
story as a demonstration of understanding, is exactly what the 
point was. It doesn't much matter how you do it, bucket of 
hot water or cow-pat. If he didn't see it this way at the 
time, then how did he see it? 
While these two incidents are superficially similar, we 
cannot feel the same about them. The bunch of young boys in 
the farm yard, chasing after the cows and racing for the cow-
pats, warming their feet while they fight off their brothers -
it is an innocent and hilarious scene. "It was bosker and 
warm sure enough. Mother wasn't too shook on our doing it at 
first, but afterwards she didn't mind." This experience is 
one which is entirely self-contained. Any comparison with 
values from a wider world is muffled (Mother wasn't too shook 
on our doing it at first). It is the gambolling and scrambling 
of young animals, and delightful to us in its exuberance and 
youthful innocence. The boys are unconscious of their poverty, 
and so engrossed in the immediate that no awareness of the 
implications of the experience within the wider context of life 
can be detected. "As I've s~id, we didn't know any other sort 
of life. 1i Thus we only have warrant to feel lightened by this 
scene. There is no element which would permit a negative or 
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even sobering emotional flavour to intrude. 
But the incident in the second half is not hilarious, 
delightful, exuberant. It leads the narrator to perceive these 
actions of the boys in the farm yard in a different light. 
We can't "enjoyll this second experience which is related. It 
is not emotionally positive, but sobering; it "gives us pause". 
"I turned up my nose at those cow-pats, - - while we were staying 
at the hotel I'd seen something that I was holding my tongue 
over - - at that age to see an old man who might be glad of a 
few cow-pats to warm himself up in was somehow too much for me." 
This experience, somehow connected with the fact that the man 
was old, forced him to view his previous experience in a new way. 
There is, therefore, much more to this story than the 
understanding of the old man's experience in terms of the 
narrator's earlier experience with cow-pats. We instantly 
recognise the similarity between the two, but (if we are able 
to attend to the thing aesthetically) we also feel the emotional 
contrast. To fail to do so is either to fail to entertain the 
fiction or to fail in reading at the most simple level. If we 
are unaware of the contrast, then the change in the boy's 
attitude towards the cow-pats must seem arbitrary. But the 
contrast between the emotional "flavour" of the two incidents 
contains the key to our understanding of this change, even if it 
is not immediately obvious. 
The narrator does not really explain this change. The 
experience must have a strong impact on him if it is to have any 
point at all - he cannot easily talk about it. Sargeson's 
working class heroes are characteristically inarticulate, but 
this one makes a point of it. He had seen something to hold 
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his tongue over. It may have stopped him asking questions -
the best answers one got out of life were not responses to 
questions. If we are to attempt to make his behaviour more 
explicitly intelligible, then, we will need to make use of what-
ever indirect evidence we can find. We must attempt to 
construct a way of viewing both the old man and the earlier 
experiences so as to make sense of the narrator's change in 
behaviour. There will, of course, be no final and authorita-
tive way of deciding whether or not this is a correct construc-
tion since there is a limit to the data available and there are 
gaps which will call for guesses. Yet we can compare one such 
account against another in terms of easily established criteria 
which might be used to check such things as the internal 
consistency of the account and its ability to deal with all 
of the features of the story. 
We should perhaps note that the man is old, that he is at 
the end of his life and struggling to meet one of the funda-
mental requirements of human existence - warmth. He asks if 
he can warm himself with a bucket of water which is being used 
to wash the steps of a hotel at which the boy is a guest. He 
must ask a younger man, a porter, a nominal servant of the boy, 
if he may do so. There are two dimensions of this event which 
are absent from the previous experience. Firstly, there is an 
awareness of age, and the mention of this age permits a contrast 
to be made with the youth of the boys. We might not be blamed 
for going on to note the nearness of an old man to death. At 
the end of his days he is at the mercy of one of the most 
primitive requirements for the maintenance of life and "might be 
glad of a few cow-pats to warm himself up in". 
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But there is a social dimension present in this second 
experience which was not there before. The porter, a servant 
of the boy's uncle, has no need of cow-pats, and the old man 
is at his mercy over the use of the water bucket. The need of 
the hot water betrays the old man's poverty. The porter and 
the boy's uncle don't need buckets of water to alleviate the 
cold. They are not directly chained to their raw physical 
environments - they are insulated and freed to pursue the more 
clearly human. The old man is poor, and at the end of his life 
is still struggling to come to terms with the demands of his 
animal existence. All of this the boy has seen from a vantage 
point somewhere near the side of his uncle and the porter. He 
was able to see the request for the use of the bucket through 
the eyes of the porter and he saw that the action was an 
admission of poverty and an inability to satisfactorily cope 
with the physical world. Thus the innocence of the use of the 
cow-pats was lost. From that instant he could no longer say 
that "we didn't think we were hardly done by - we didn't know 
any other sort of life". The immediacy of the cow-pats 
incidents was destroyed. It was now launched out into a wider 
world where it could be seen in terms of lifetime and poverty. 
It would always be possible now for the boy to see how a 
person, liberated from the necessity to work in bare feet and 
milk the cows on frosty mornings, would view such behaviour. 
The boy grew up a little in that experience. The change 
in attitude is not just a matter of rejecting cow-pats as a 
means of warming feet. The experience wrought some deeper 
change. He had been a little boy asking the porter "what he did 
this that and the other thing for", just as little boys are 
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inclined to do. But then he saw the old man. "Well, that was 
something I understood without having to ask any questions. 
Perhaps it's stopped me asking a good many questions in my life." 
And when he went back to the farm he wouldn't try to explain why 
he stopped using cow-pats. 
It needn't be claimed that the boy didn't know about 
poverty and age before this incident occurred. We merely need 
to note that the experience forced together certain sets of 
beliefs and values which had not previously been seen as 
related. New learning is made possible by the heightened 
attention of the occasion. It is focussed, in this instance, 
by the conflict of emotion arising from two seemingly similar 
experiences. The second experience which the boy had enabled 
him to gain new knowledge. As with the boy with this 
experience, so with us when we confront art. We experience it, 
and in doing so consider in a new way things we have previously 
believed or undergone. It is rather pointless to attempt to 
identify the specific pieces of knowledge we can acquire through 
confrontations with particular works of art. The things we 
learn from art may differ indefinitely from individual to 
individual, depending on the knowledge, beliefs and values which 
we bring into our experience of the work. 
Having an experience is no assurance that we have acquired 
knowledge, of course. Any beliefs we gain from our involvement 
with art must have rational support before we can defend know-
ledge claims. But art engages our attention in the contexts of 
various beliefs and values and, through calling up a host of 
associations and in some cases employing the time dimension to 
apply pressure, it forces us to feel. It is in the course of 
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this attention and feeling that a work of art can expose 
relationships between beliefs and values which, in the ordinary 
course of things, we might never have noticed. Great and 
enduring works are remarkable for the very richness of such 
relationships and the diversity and subtlety of feeling with 
which they are accompanied. They permit us to turn to them 
again and again throughout our lives, or again and again 
throughout the ages to mine their seemingly inexhaustible wealth. 
Nevertheless, although we cannot set out the specific 
knowledges particular people might well gain from a specific 
work, and hence cannot evaluate it in terms of these, critics 
can consider the themes to see whether the treatment is new, 
permitting fresh insights, or whether it is merely a reworking 
of what has been done so thoroughly before. They can also 
consider the kinds of elements which are prominent in the work 
as opposed to those which are not. Are these things thrown 
forward in such a way that we are forced to regard them 
differently from the ways in which we are inclined to regard 
them in everyday life (perhaps by being presented with certain 
features pared away permitting other aspects normally obscured 
to become more apparent; or are some features put in slightly 
new contexts which expose their relationships to the things 
which normally surround them)? And what is the value of this 
"different view" which the work permits? Does it point up the 
danger of certain cliches or otherwise illuminate important 
features of some other matter of considerable human interest or 
concern? 
Just as, without any doubt whatsoever, the painter may 
through his paintings train the eye of the beholder, not 
just to see more of his own paintings, or else of someone 
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else's paintings, but apples, boulevards, clouds, a foot, 
rain on the ocean, and the coyness that may lurk in an 
old woman's eye; so may the writer of fiction train us 
to be more observant of human traits and of configurations 
of traits. At his best he is a disrupter of our stock 
responses ("how considerate the child is to give his 
brother the first bite!" "A lie is a lie." "He who 
hesitates is lost."), replacing them with somewhat 
surprising recognitions. Though reality will never be 
that neat, and though we be on Qur own (alas!), still we 
may now do bettero 37 
Where some visual art and music are concerned, it would be 
necessary to pursue the line developed by Arnheim somewhat 
further in the light of this argument and attempt to show why 
there is merit in attending to the sweep of the Japanese wave. 
But we are concerned with literature and the knowledge of other 
people's feelings, and it must be demonstrated that there are 
valued themes in literary works, the treatment of which calls 
for an exploration of the feelings of characters. There is no 
problem here if we are prepared to acknowledge the moral content 
of much of literature, since if we can justify any human enquiry 
it is the enquiry into fitting ways for men to live. 
III "Knowing How Other People Feel" and "Ethical Art" 
No novelist can achieve anything 
permanent without a moral basis or 
background. 
Arnold Bennett, 1925. 38 
While abstract visual art concerns itself with the beliefs 
and values which structure the more formal elements of our 
visual perception, the concern of literature, and particularly 
the novel, the short-story and drama, is more clearly social. 
, J.L., "Coming to Know Persons, Including Oneself", 
Aesthetics and Problems of Education,op.cit. Page 220. 
38 . Introductory Note to Gide, A., Dostoevsky, Penguin Books, 1925. 
Page 8. 
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We might go further with safety and conclude that the content 
of these arts is overwhelmingly ethical, if this concept is 
construed fairly broadly. Although artists are traditionally 
concerned to show us what men are like, they do not attempt to 
show us men in vacuo, but against a set of beliefs, ideals and 
assumptions. Dramatic conflict arises from a treatment of 
what man is like held against a conception of a universe having 
a particular moral structure, or, in the absence of such a 
structure (a chaotic, randomly ordered or malevolent universe), 
a conception of what is fitting for man. As a criterion of 
value, this "ethical" concern is one applied to an appraisal of 
the whole work rather than to particular regional qualities. 
It represents a continuous theme in art theory from Aristotle's 
concern for the "tragic" to later considerations of the "sublime", 
to the "high seriousness" and "sincerity" of more recent 
centuries. "High seriousness", "sincerity" and "sublimity" 
are terms of praise which do not, however, serve to help us pick 
out the particular kinds of qualities which are valued. 
"Tragedy" does so, but it is bound up with the heroic, which 
seems rather unsuitable today, and it does not assist us in our 
dealings with the comic or "black comic". Ethical art faces 
us squarely with the human struggle with the "ought". 
It was clear in the case of Cow-pats that an understanding 
of the ethical content of the work of art was dependent upon an 
understanding of the feelings of the narrator. The requirement 
is just as urgent here as it is in those cases where we need 
such understanding in order to. make moral decisions. In Cow-
pats, we have a short-story which centres around a conception of 
how human beings ought to live. The theme is treated by 
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presenting two experiences through the eyes of one man, and 
since our concern is with the effect of these experiences on him 
we must understand how he feels, as well as what he thinks. 
In other cases, when a particular moral cosmology is a matter of 
central concern, we experience this through the actions and 
feelings of the characters. 
For such ethical work to be possible we must be able to 
accept the protagonists as plausibly human. E.M. Forster has 
drawn our attention to the differences in literature between 
round and flat characters, and it is clear that, particularly in 
well-peopled works, extremely simple representations of 
39 
characters are readily accepted. Such one-dimensional 
characters face strict limitations in the parts they can play in 
the action if they are not to destroy plausibility. When the 
flat character who epitomizes "greed" suddenly becomes generous 
we cease to believe in the artist's world which suddenly appears 
open to arbitrary, "magical" modification (unless, of course, 
the point of the change rests on the particular facts about the 
universe in the novel - in the supernatural intervention or the 
employment of some sorts of hypnotism or conditioning to control 
behaviour) • 
The disturbance occasioned by such radical modification 
of a flat character is similar to that which exists when a stereo-
type is challenged in real life: we assume that there are facts 
we have not taken into account and we expect to be able to find 
them. If these facts are not revealed in the work of fiction 
until the radical change takes place the reader justifiably feels 
Forster, E.M., Aspects of the Novel, Edward Arnold, London, 
1927. Page 65. 
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tricked, as on those occasions when at the end of a detective 
story the sleuth solves the mystery by introducing a whole new 
body of additional information which completely restructures 
the character of a principal suspect. Simple characters cannot 
act as if out of a complex set of motives if they are to appear 
to readers as more than an author's puppets - they need to be 
"fleshed out", or become multidimensional. Clearly the under-
lying issue here centres upon the relationship between the 
ethical issue and the structure of the fictional world. 
Plausibility in satire makes different demands upon the nature 
of this fictive world than does tragedy for example. Thus a 
significant concern of the critic is the extent to which we can 
enter into the world of the work and believe that such people 
might exist and act in a particular way, since this participa-
tion is a necessary condition to an understanding of the ethical 
issues themselves. 
Very frequently the world which the artist creates permits 
characterisations which we accept as plausible within the 
"world" of the work, but which we would not very readily accept 
in the world we live in. In Heller's Catch-22, Colonel 
Cathcart and Milo Minderbinder are extravagant military 
characters who would stand out incongruously in a world which 
did not support their behaviour. But apart from the waves of 
sanity in Yossarian, the "world" of Catch-22 is an insane world. 
Minderbinder and Cathcart are extreme stereotypes or caricatures, 
but they are like this because it was Heller's wish to thrust 
us face-to-face with the incipient insanity of communities at 
war - particularly military ones. Such exaggeration and 
caricature is needed to force us through the set of supporting 
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beliefs which surround the military establishment so that we see 
Heller's point. 40 
Great Expectations is an interesting example of a novel in 
which an elaborate thematic construction organises the fortunes 
of a host of characters but, seemingl~ because of the demands of 
characterisation, fails to achieve a satisfactory aesthetic 
conclusion. This work measures the effects of two sets of 
values on the life of the narrator in terms of the people who 
are bound up with his destiny and who are instrumental in creatine 
his expectations of wealth and position, or those who remain 
untouched by them. This "progress" of Pip's occurs against 
certain conceptions of "crime", "guilt" and "justice". The 
relationships between the characters are built upon a mass of 
coincidences in the interests of the theme - coincidences which 
would be implausible outside the world of the novel. These 
coincidental relationships are forged into a tightly bound 
structure so that character stands out against character. 
Magwitch the convict adopts Pip and makes him a gentleman. 
Miss Havisharn adopts Estella and brings her up to break men's 
hearts (she breaks Pip's). Miss Havisham and Magwitch are 
linked by Campeyson, the gentleman who commits crimes against 
them both. They are linked again through Estella who is 
Magwitch's daughter. Pip is linked to Miss Havisham, since she 
leads him to believe that she is the source of his expectations. 
Magwitch and Miss Havisham are further linked by the same 
lawyer (Jaggers), a fact which encourages Pip's false belief in 
the source of his expectations. When all is revealed, and Pip's 
expectations crumble about him he attempts to return to the Eden 
ller, J., Catch-22, Corgi Books, London, 1962. 
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which he left - Joe and Biddy and the forge. This return of 
the prodigal is, Millhauser has pointed out, a suitable point 
for concluding the ethical theme. But Pip is too much changed 
to become a village blacksmith. 
Dickens must have felt the situation was one that cannot 
be handled gracefully. Pip loves Joe loyally, but he 
has little to say to him; more importantly, perhaps, he 
has no need of him, now that he is neither a child nor 
ill. He is no longer a snob, but he has become 
habituated to another world. He actually has more in 
cornmon with that amiable nonentity Herbert Pocket, whom 
accordingly he joins for the next eight years or so, and 
to whom, with or without Estella, he will presumably 
return. The difference, the decisive difference, between 
Joe (who carries off all the moral honours) and Herbert, 
is one of background, breeding, interests, class. 
(Herbert was fond of Handel; Joe thundered out "Old 
Clem"·)41 
Thus the Prodigal Son becomes the Industrious Apprentice 
- he goes to work with Herbert in Cairo. "The one good thing 
he did in his prosperity, the only thing that endures and bears 
good fruit." But Millhauser finds this section "dry", "remote", 
"shadowy" - in contrast to the richness of the novel up to that 
point and in spite of the fact that they deal with a "firming" 
of Pip's character and permit something further to be done about 
Pip's relationship with Estella. Perhaps this section was 
a convenient way out of certain difficulties. As a plot 
expedient, it functions effectively: it separates Pip 
from Joe and Biddy, who might otherwise prove awkward to 
deal with; it permits him to meet Estella after a long 
period during which each has matured through a series of 
disappointments, efforts, and morally enlightening 
experiences. But it is not used - merely mentioned. 42 
This section of Great Expectations carries us on, then, to 
Ilhauser, M., "Great Expectations: The Three Endings", 
Dickens Studies Annual, vol. 2, (ed.) Partlow, R.B. Jr. 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1972. Page 272. 
42 Ibid . Page 273. 
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that famous final scene of which we have two versions. In the 
first of these, Dickens 
stands at a little distance and views the scene by a 
cool grey light. The reason is clear enough, - - Dickens 
had far less than usual to offer his readers in the way 
of wedding bells and pink rosettes; that harsh reality, 
Estella's predatory heart, had been insisted on too 
urgently to make any promise of ' redemption convincing. 
- - - The scene is handled rapidly and quietly, lIaway 
from all such things as they conventionally go,1I as though 
to suggest stylistically that it is no more than a comment 
on an already completed tale. 43 
The second ending is generally considered to be even less 
satisfactory. "'The patched-on second ending,' says Ross H. 
Dabney, 'is a great mistake.' And so it is: 'false in 
substance and tone,' a concession to romantic convention and, 
Dabney thinks, to class sentiment." Millhauser sees both 
endings as a formal requirement in the novel of the age rather 
than one demanded by psychological or thematic necessity. 
"The hero of the novel, however unheroic he may be, cannot 
interest himself in a young lady, however unangelic, without 
finding himself committed to a climactic sentimental exchange 
with her as the novel ends.,,44 It is impossible to leave Pip 
at "the return to the forge" because of the sort of person Pip 
has become, and yet at that point the essential elements of the 
theme have been resolved. The first version of the ending adds 
nothing and is irrelevant. Any attempt at a resolution with 
Estella must fail, however, because it must be a reward for Pip, 
fulfilling his "expectations". And it would, of course, force 
a sudden new dimension into Estella's character at a most 
awkward point. Her vengeance upon men is too central and vital 
to be lightly thrown away_ 
44Ibid • Page 274. 
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But the demands of the theme are not the only ones which 
force our understanding of characters in literature to be 
different from our understanding of people in everyday life. 
For, although it is true that we nlust enter their experiencing 
of their world, it is not true that we always do this as we do 
in real life. cow-pats and Great Expectations are examples of 
works which provide us with knowledge in much the same manner 
as we might gain it in everyday life - that is, through a first-
person account. But let us consider one of the greatest 
ethical dramas - Macbeth. Here we have a play concerning a 
man whose ambition leads him to choose to cut across the grain 
of the moral order of the universe and, realising that there 
could be no wiping out of the sin or turning back from the 
inevitable failure and death, resolutely carries on. The theme 
of the play is the wiping out of this crime against the moral 
order, and it is to be experienced largely through Macbeth's 
perception of his desires and the significance of what he has 
done and will do. Our participation in his experience is, 
however, not restricted to the kinds of events from which we can 
work out people's feelings in everyday life. Macbeth 
soliloquizes frequently, and employs language rich in imagery 
and with great power to move. These features of the character's 
behaviour are "not natural", but, through drawing on associations 
called up by imagery and through articulating thoughts which 
would not usually be revealed, serve to catch us up in his 
mental life. 
Corne, seeling night, 
Scarf up the tender eye of pitiful day, 
And with thy bloody and invisible hand 
Cancel and tear to pieces that great bond 
Which keeps me pale! Light thickens, and the crow 
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Makes wing to the rooky wood; 
Good things of day begin to droop and drowse, 
Whiles night's black agents to their preys do rouseo 45 
Only superficially does this describe a time of day_ In 
the context of the play this passage expresses a state of mind. 
Yet if we consider the passage in the light of our everyday 
experience it seems improbable that a man would stop to describe 
his feelings of the moment in such a fashion. "Seeling" night, 
"scarfing", "tender" eyes (of day), "bloody and invisible hands" 
(of night), "light thickening", "crows", "rooky woods", "night's 
black agents", "preys" - these words draw on associations which 
are part of basic human experiences and they are orchestrated 
so that we are forced through feelings supposedly akin to the 
ones expressed. 
Thus there are certain characteristics of literary art 
which make the critic's task in coming to know the feelings of 
characters a somewhat different matter from our task of knowing 
how a person feels in everyday life. On the one hand the 
logical limit to the acquisition of further facts is drawn 
differently in literature. If Jane is said to be tall and 
blond and blue-eyed it is normally logically odd to question 
this unless there is some narrative point concerning the falsity 
of statements in the work. Similarly, it makes no sense to try 
and verify the statement by trying to find Jane or someone who 
has met her. On the other hand, we are often provided with 
vastly more information in certain respects than is available to 
us ordinarily. When eye-of-God, or interior monologue 
techniques are employed we can actually "enter" other minds. 
III, Scene II. 
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It is apparent, then, that in the performance of his task 
of making clear the concerns embodied in a work and showing us 
how it should appropriately be viewed, a literary critic must 
have recourse to the kinds of evidence and procedures we employ 
in coming to know how other people feel in everyday life. It 
is equally plain, however, that since the concerns of literary 
works are rarely confined merely to psychological studies, and 
since our means of access to literary worlds and the structure 
of the worlds themselves frequently differ from our everyday 
experience in important respects, it will be necessary to 
consider our own particular educational interests in the light 
of this discussion of literature and criticism. 
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CHAPTER VI EDUCATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
We are now in a position to consider the claim that there 
is no incompatibility between the use of literature to develop 
the ability to understand the feelings of others and the 
requirements of a literary education. The task of the critic 
is to show us how a piece of literature should be read in order 
that it be satisfactorily understood (that is, he must attempt 
to set out a reasonable description and interpretation of the 
literary work) • He must also assess the value of the work in 
terms of those features of the world which it highlights, and 
in terms of the manner in which these things are highlighted. 
One of the purposes of a literary education is to enable pupils 
to carry out these tasks for themselves. 
When critics perform their descriptive and interpretive 
tasks on those works of literature in which the feelings of 
characters are important (as in much ethical art), they must 
often employ the same procedures as those which we employ in 
everyday life when we wish to know how other people feel. In 
order to understand how to appraise many works, particularly 
those written in some other age, critics must be able to 
conceive how the work would be viewed if their own beliefs were 
quite different. It is no accident that an important debate 
in recent aesthetics is concerned with a question of belief very 
similar to one dealt with in Chapter III. T.S. Eliot, in a 
crucial essay on Dante's Divine Comedy, raised the question of 
whether one could be a non-Catholic and yet fully understand 
the work. 46 Presumably a Catholic would be able to believe in 
liot, T. S., "Dante", Selected Essays, Faber and Faber Ltd., 
London, 1932. Page 257. 
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the world represented in the work while other readers would not. 
The latter would have to content themselves with imagining what 
it would be like to believe. This raised other questions. 
Is it sufficient to be a modern Catholic or must one be a 
Catholic of the Renaissance before one can "fully" understand 
the work? If the Catholic has an advantage is it merely that 
he has more facts at his disposal? Presumably to feel what the 
Renaissance critic felt when he read the work we must believe 
certain things about the universe which he would have believed, 
just as to feel the emotion that any other man feels we must 
believe what he believes. It is impossible for most of us to 
hold the beliefs about the universe which structure the Renais-
sance man's appraisal of the Divine Comed~. Hence it cannot be 
the same work of art for us as it was for him. Nevertheless, 
our understanding of the work is governed by our attempt to 
work out how the world of the work would seem if we believed 
those things which Dante could assume that his readers believed. 
(An understanding of these things may, for example, be vital to 
an understanding of how the characters see their world.) This 
is similar to the case where we work out what another man feels. 
But if we do not hold the same beliefs about the object (of art 
or of an emotion) as the other man we will never experience it 
as he does. 
Thus the appropriate response to a work of literature 
depends upon the recognition that certain beliefs about the 
world of the work are to be taken as true. The implications of 
this may be very complex when we begin to consider how the 
characters behave in these works. Should their actions and 
emotions be seen as reasonable in the light of the manner in 
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which their "world" is ordered? Readers must learn how to 
penetrate into. the behaviour of central characters to unravel 
these things. A satisfactory understanding of a work will not 
be possible unless they are able to do so. A critic must, in 
the course of his training, learn those procedures which will 
permit him to work out what it would be like to hold the beliefs 
held by a particular group of readers or (which is more to our 
point) by individual characters. Since these procedures are 
the same, in many cases, as those we use in everyday life, there 
is no incompatibility here between the interests of a literary 
education and the suggestion that we use literature to develop 
in pupils the ability to understand how other people feel. 
A facility with these procedures constitutes only a 
relatively small part of the repertoire which a critic must 
develop, however, and a literary education would still be 
threatened by moral educators if this interest began to displace 
attention given to other facets of literary study. We must 
strive for a literary balance of material when we are selecting 
works for literary study in schools, therefore, and seek out 
works particularly valuable for the development of this ability 
when the requirements of a literary education warrant it. 
Nevertheless, works of literature could clearly be used for this 
purpose in other parts of the educational programme without 
detriment to the interests of literature. 
But if this is the case why bother about using "literature" 
as such at all, except as it appropriately arises in the course 
of literary study? Are there not works of fiction which have 
little literary merit but which might be better for our purposes? 
The answer to this question should follow from the account of 
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literature which has been given in the previous chapter. We 
judge the worth of a piece of literature by its aesthetic value 
and by the value of the knowledge we can gain from it through 
having our attention drawn to particular features of the world. 
The aesthetic value is derived from the quality of the 
experience: these important and valued aspects of the world are 
"impressed" upon us. Clearly, to judge a work of fiction which 
deals with the feelings of people as effective is to make a 
literary judgement according to such criteria. It has been 
argued that the features of our world which are picked out by 
works of literature are often valued for the ethical insights 
they permit (if "ethical" is construed fairly broadly) but this 
is not a necessary co~dition: it merely reflects our preoccu-
pation with ethical matters. If a work dealt only with the 
feelings of others but did so very effectively it would be judged 
according to the same criteria. Works which deal only with the 
feelings of others are, however, somewhat rare, yet "ethical art" 
frequently demands a treatment of the feelings of protagonists 
in the interests of its themes. 
Suppose, then, that someone was to claim that a certain 
book, although poor on literary grounds, would nevertheless help 
young people to understand a certain emotion better than would a 
"good" book because, through its crude, gross and unsubtle 
execution, it would enable immature readers to obtain a simple 
insight into an emotion otherwise inaccessible in a sophisticated 
treatment. Such a work might "hammer home" a very crude 
stereotype for readers who lac~ even the simplest means of 
identifying beliefs characteristic of a particular appraisal. 
It should be clear, however, that to use such an argument is to 
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be concerned with the literary criteria and the dependence of 
these on certain pedagogical matters where children's literature 
is concerned, for it is to suggest that the experience of this 
work is more accessible to the immature than are other more 
worthwhile experiences. When we are concerned with literary 
education we must take account of the fact that accessibility 
to literary experience is dependent upon relative maturity. 
The only justification for choosing this crude, unsubtle book 
over other works is that although the others permit more 
sophisticated understanding, even a very simple understanding 
will not be possible for the immature. If we have several 
books, each of which can in fact be appreciated by the young 
reader, we will choose between them on the basis of such 
criteria as the accuracy with which the emotion is represented 
and the force of its presentation. The better book (given that 
all are equally forceful) will be the one which, though greatly 
simplified, is built upon the most sophisticated interpretive 
schemes and is hence the least misleading. Thus, if there are 
no particular educational reasons for preferring one book to 
another, it is always better for the development of the ability 
with which we are concerned if works which are of considerable 
literary merit are used in preference to works which are not. 
Criteria for selecting books for the immature must include 
certain pedagogical considerations even when our concern is 
exclusively with a literary education. Suitable works need to 
be scrutinized to see that they do not contain language or 
vocabulary which is too sophisticated or archaic for pupils to 
understand what the work is about, or that the feelings and 
situations with which they deal are not so far distanced from 
110 
the experience of the readers as to be incomprehensible. There 
is no point in presenting preadolescents with sophisticated and 
subtle works which treat adult love (treatments, that is, 
which call for sophisticated understanding), simply because they 
will not have developed sufficiently to make much of the mental 
states as they are presented. This is not to say that 
children should not be exposed to themes from this general 
region of human behaviour, but merely that the treatment which 
is suitable for a nine-year-old is not the treatment which is 
suitable for an educated adult. What is required for the nine-
year-old is the fullest possible understanding of the feelings 
of the characters in the light of the experience he has 
available and in terms of the procedures discussed in the 
earlier chapters of this thesis, with the proviso that the 
literary encounter will not be one which will reduce his 
willingness to engage in further literary study. 
Lack of certain experiences may also mean that pupils are 
unable to respond to works of literature appropriately. There 
would be no point in presenting a pupil with the quotation from 
Macbeth which was used in the previous chapter (Come, seeling 
night - -) if he lacked the tradition which would enable him to 
associate such things as crows and rooky woods with such other 
things as witchcraft, night and death. Fortunately, these 
associations are probably almost universal, yet it is not 
inconceivable that such associations might be lacking and in 
some cases the kind of lack may mean that the literary experience 
is inaccessible. All sorts of experiences, then, from comic-
books to forests at night, may have a part in ensuring that 
literary works have the necessary aesthetic effect, and again 
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the educator must judge that the pupils have had a minimum of 
experiences to enable the work to be of value to them. 
Thus the task of criticising literature for the young 
introduces considerations from the domains of educational philo-
sophy and developmental psychology with which literary critics 
do not normally have to contend. A literary critic as a 
rational enquirer depends upon his own cultivated sensibilities 
and the careful ,self-examination of these in order to determine 
what the experience of a particular work has to offer sophisti-
cated seekers of truth. This stance permits him to consider 
the value of children's literature in a similar manner. But 
children's literature is literature for the immature: for the 
unsophisticated seeker of aesthetic experience and truth. The 
critic must "put himself in the place" of the intended audience 
and attempt to evaluate the experiences which he could reasonably 
expect of readers of a given level of immaturity. This problem 
is compounded by the fact that immature readers cannot be asked 
to go to the lengths that might be expected of sophisticated 
students in the pursuit of the experiences a work has to offer. 
It may take several readings and much analysis before the riches 
of a complex adult work begin to be revealed. Readers who are 
committed to the pursuit of knowledge often must anticipate 
dreary hours of reading material they do not understand, as well 
as extensive related reading to enable them to construct appro-
priate appraisals. They hope for some new insight to be won 
from their long investigation, or else that their present 
experience will be refined, but such hopes cannot be expected in 
young readers who have not yet been initiated into the values 
and procedures of this form of thought. Children's literature 
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must, therefore, capture the attention of children rather 
readily, and critics of children's works must somehow take this 
into consideration - hence the expanding body of empirical work 
on the reading preferences of children. 
Clearly there is a considerable difference between deciding 
which experiences are of value to man, as must a critic of adult 
works, and deciding what experiences are of value to children, 
as must the critic of children's literature. Valuable 
experiences will, obviously enough, be limited to those which 
will further initiation into the rational forms of thought and 
modes of experience, yet if we look at this requirement more 
closely we can see that some conflicts may arise. We have to 
eliminate experiences which may be detrimental to children in 
view of the degree to which they are not fully rational since, 
as a consequence, they will be more open to irrational persua-
sion, suggestion, or may in other ways be more "impressionable" 
than rational adults are. Although we may wonder about the 
value of Plato's criticism of the effects of immorality in 
literature where works for people who are rational are 
considered, we cannot deny the force of the argument where the 
young are concerned (and Plato's interest was, after all, in 
education). But we are left in something of a dilemma if, 
while being aware that there is such a danger, we are not as sure 
as Plato how the right choices should be made. 
Let us consider an actual case. In the October 1970 issue 
of Elementary English, Sheldon Root Jr. reviewed Don't Play Dead 
Before You Have To by Maia Wojciechowska. This is a book which 
might be read by fifth and sixth graders and concerns a boy by 
the name of Byron who is baby-sitter, teacher and companion for 
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another named Charlie. The construction and execution of this 
work comes in for considerable praise, as does much of the 
content. "There are those among us who will reject the book 
due to the negative image of the school. Because it hurts. 
And it hurts because it is in such a large measure true!" But 
there are three questions which trouble the reviewer. First, 
Byron is a compulsive swearer. "It cannot be denied that the 
use of such language is an effective attention gaining device. 
Whether or not it is to be condoned is quite a different 
matter." It should be noted that this criticism of the 
language does not seem concerned with artistic necessity. 
But, two questions remain to be resolved before arriving 
at a tentative evaluation of the book. 
First, will the reader fathom the depths of the changes 
that take place in Byron? Must the searching questions 
that Byron asks be so violently cast against a society 
that is made to appear so obviously corrupt? Isn't the 
young reader apt to take unto himself the early Byron and 
not understand that Byron has worked things out within the 
exis~ing framework? 
My reaction is, no! Kids are living in a world that 
comes to grips with them, even if they don't want to come 
to grips with it. They will understand the changes in 
Byron as they take place and they will find satisfaction 
in knowing that someone, at least, has made some headway 
toward resolving his problems. 47 
Here, then, we have an attempt to imagine how children will 
appraise the work, and to decide whether or not the correct 
appraisal is too difficult for them to manage. 
Second, do the author's ends justify her means? Isn't 
the entire relationship between Charlie and Byron too 
unhealthy to portray in a book for young readers? 
My reaction to this question is more ambivalent. From 
all appearances, Charlie was Byron's lay psychiatrist. 
47Root , S. Jr., "Books for Children", Elementary English, vol. 
XLVII, October 1970. Page 852. 
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Because of Charlie, Byron was able to work through his 
hang- ups. But is the reverse equally true? Might 
Charlie not have been far better off had there not been 
a Byron? If this is true, is it acceptable in children's 
books to portray such a use of one individual by another? 
I think not! 
Whether or not the young reader will interpret the 
relationship this way, I do not · yet know. I do intend 
to find out. - - If young readers see Byron as Charlie's 
salvation, then I will gladly reverse my tentatively held 
conclusion . 
I am quite sure that Maia Wojciechowska did not intend to 
portray Byron as a parasite. 48 
It seems that Root considers it to be somewhat of an open 
question as to whether Byron should be seen as a paras~te or not, 
but the point is that if he is seen as a parasite then Root 
feels that this may be a bad thing because he wonders if it is 
"acceptable in children's books to portray such a use of one 
individual . by another". Presumably this is because impressio-
nable ten and eleven- year- olds might identify with Byron and be 
led to imitate this use of others, since they are not yet 
capable of objectively evaluating what Byron is doing to Charlie 
in terms of overriding moral imperatives. Bad people are very 
common in highly praised children's literature, however, so 
there must be some way in which writers can treat characters who 
do bad things without having their works incur the disfavour of 
critics such as Root . The danger here may be that Byron is the 
hero whose personality dominates the work. Since he does not 
seem to be aware that he might be using Charlie and since he 
does not appear to suffer any consequences of this undesirable 
behaviour, it might appear that it is condoned . There would 
seem to be two ways of preventing this from happening in 
children's works. We could make it unlikely that readers would 
48 Ibid . 
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identify with characters who do bad things by keeping their 
characterisation "flat" and "shadowy". If their motives seem 
clearly malicious and we cannot see how we might feel like that 
in similar circumstances, then we are unlikely to identify with 
them. This would be helped if the hero is "good" and 
characterised sufficiently richly to make identification with 
him more likely. The other solution would be to ensure that 
characters in children's fiction who do bad things "get their 
deserts". Heroes should see the error of their ways and feel 
remorse. Villains should be confronted with their sins and 
helped to reform. The agents of such an education can either 
be "wise" men or "chance" events which occur in the world of 
the work to show that you cannot be bad and get away with it. 
We must take account of this view. Pupils might acquire 
undesirable attitudes through identifying with bad characters. 
In practice it is questionable whether we know enough about what 
goes on in children's minds to be able to formulate sound rules 
to help us judge whether critical judgements such as the ones 
Sheldon Root has made are in fact justified. In what circum-
stances will such an identification overturn a value held with 
a particular strength? What is required before a person can 
separate the consideration of the morality of another person's 
acts from his personal appeal, and at what stage can we decide 
that young people are able to do this? What are the effects of 
the various contexts in which the work is read? What is the 
effect of reading a work which projects undesirable values as 
one among many similar works; as one among works projecting a 
variety of different values; or as a work read under adult 
supervision (and what are the effects of different kinds of 
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supervision)? This last is of particular importance since we 
may assume that aesthetic and moral education require the 
participation of teachers who are advanced in moral and 
aesthetic matters. Where aesthetic education is concerned 
pupils must learn to understand works better so that their 
responses can be enhanced and refined. In the case which has 
been discussed, it might be important for the pupils to consider 
the extent to which Byron uses Charlie. This would permit a 
consideration (beyond the concerns of criticism but within the 
bounds of moral education ) of whether or not one should act as 
Byron has acted. We really know very little about the factors 
involved in any of these questions. 
It is important to take note of some of the very real 
difficulties which might arise from the use of this kind of 
criticism. First there is the danger of selecting too severely, 
of imposing a value system by eliminating anything which makes a 
case for particular values other than those we hold. This may 
still be bad, even when we are convinced that the values which 
we are supporting can be justified. . Whether the values are 
rational or not, by eliminating some We may close off value 
questions which should, in the interests of the later rational 
development of the pupils, remain somewhat open. The second 
danger is that a concern for ensuring that the right values are 
promoted against the wrong ones may mean that children are 
systematically misled by fictional worlds which differ 
consistently from the real world which they will increasingly 
encounter. When they find out that in real life the bad man 
sometimes does "get away with it " (using other people? ) without 
so much as a twinge of the conscience, and that some people who 
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are doing wrong cannot be brought to recognise it, and even that 
virtuous men sometimes fail, pitifully and ignobly, they may 
come to reject fiction as false escapism, since in one sense it 
will not only have failed to help them to accommodate to the 
world but will have actually led them astray . This is not an 
argument against fantasy in children's literature, nor is it an 
argument against fictional worlds which are morally ordered in 
a particular way, but it is an argument for a balance in the 
literary fare we present to children. 
A third danger is that we may handicap children in their 
attempts to come to understand people who represent values we 
don't condone. If bad people are always presented in a 
shadowy fashion in children's literature, then children will be 
presented with a disproportionate amount of material helping them 
to understand the feelings of people who do right things as 
against the people who do wrong. Similarly, if the fates must 
always turn against bad characters to purge them of their 
crimes, then children's literature will either have to ignore 
important features of many moral situations or else the plots of 
works which deal with these situations will have to take 
implausible twists. It has been stated elsewhere that "in real 
life the difficulty is usually even to see the point of wicked, 
cruel, stupid or malicious behaviour".49 Yet in our attempts 
to behave morally it is often vital that we understand what led 
a person to behave wickedly or maliciously, even though our 
sympathies will be more likely to move to people victimised by 
such behaviour. We may have difficulty translating our PHIL 
49Gribble, J. and Oliver, R.G., "Empathy and Education", op.cit. 
Page 19. 
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principle into action because we more readily understand what 
it is to suffer the malice or viciousness of others than we 
understand what brings a person to the point of being malicious 
or vicious. Hence we may seriously weaken the capacity of 
children to make adequate moral judgements by providing them 
with a literary content which might promote this imbalance. 
It is clear, therefore, that the literary critic and the 
moral educator face a formidable task when they attempt to 
select literature which will help pupils to understand how 
other people feel. They must not only consider certain complex 
requirements which the pupil's particular stages of development 
will impose on any literary selection, but they must also 
consider the suitability of literature in terms of its capacity 
to facilitate this knowledge of others. There are two aspects 
of this facilitation which should be considered. First, there 
is the matter of creating and elaborating stereotypes and inter-
pretive schemes, and second, there is the use of works of 
literature to develop procedures for considering primary and 
secondary facts and reconstructing appraisals. 
Special attention might well be given to crucial but 
pernicious stereotypes which any particular group of pupils 
might hold. All literature would, of course, be presented with 
the intention of enhancing the understanding of the feelings of 
particular people yet in some cases it may be necessary to give 
special attention to breaking down deeply entrenched and limiting 
stereotypes - the Negro, the Jew, or the unemployed, for example . 
Other groups which will deserve special attention are those with 
whom people have constant dealings but from whom they differ 
substantially in experience, beliefs, and values as well as in 
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physical development . Paramount among these must be questions 
of age and sex, and certain important roles such as parenthood. 
These literary experiences must be chosen not only with an eye 
to the kinds of feelings represented but also with attention to 
the manner of presentation. Understanding of these experiences 
will be enhanced when analogies are established with experiences 
the pupils have already had. This is very demanding of writers 
of children's literature since richness of experience and 
language are lacking where the young are concerned. 
We can all think of famous stereotypes which we have 
acquired from literature - the masculine Hemingway hunter, 
Kipling's ex- public school adventurer- soldier, Shaw's inspired, 
insightful and rational women, Wilde's young men of wit and 
studied indolence. And we all have our collection of colourful 
individuals who mark off extreme "types" for us - the Fagins, 
the Pumblechooks, the Jimmy Porters. But the most fruitful 
characters are those like Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment 
who not only provide us with "types" but, as fully "rounded" 
characters, have been investigated in such depth that they 
illuminate the nature of emotion itself. Shakespeare provides 
us with some of the best examples - Macbeth, Othello, Hamlet, 
Richards II and III. The more characters we confront who feel 
emotions falling under one concept, but arising out of different 
beliefs and values and in the contexts of different cultures 
and sub- cultures, the more we will be exposed to the richness of 
behaviour required if we are to develop comprehensive inter-
pretive schemes. The privileged status which authors often 
grant to narrators to enable them to show us the mental events 
of characters more directly than would be possible from complete 
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descriptions of observable behaviour permits us to more 
accurately identify an emotion than would often be the case in 
everyday life. Because of this the relationship fundamental 
to interpretive schemes - that which exists between an emotion 
and its manifestation in behaviour - is more clearly available 
for observation. 
When we consider what can be done with literature by way 
of preparing pupils to seek the facts and reconstruct the 
appraisals which determine particular emotions we must take 
account of the way in which the facts occur in works of fiction. 
Some of the facts which are made available through the peculiar 
stance of the narrator (eye- of- God, or the employment of 
"interior monologue" or "flashback" techniques ) could never be 
available in real life. In addition, a very large part of the 
"art" of producing effective fiction is in the guidance we 
receive from the careful selection of facts which are important. 
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One of the things one has to learn about reading litera-
ture is to attend to the details as probably significant 
in having been selected for mention. If in real life a 
companion is while talking playing with a letter opener, 
chances are we pay it little mind; in a story or a play, 
we would almost certainly register this fact as signifi-
cant: combined with other mannerisms such behaviour 
enables us to "know" the character. The configuration 
of traits is the character, and one of the things we 
sometimes commend in the "skillful and perceptive 
portrayal of character" is the economy of his selection: 
by the mention of only a handful of qualities, he has 
seemed to put us in the presence of a person both distinc-
tive and credible. It may be a very flat character, say 
a serving maid who responds to both praise and scolding 
with "I do my best, mum," and yet this little refrain may 
be used so tellingly that we feel there really is little 
else to the person than what has been thus revealed. Or 
the character may be subtle, profound, possessed of deep 
feelings, played upon by dark, unconscious forces; 
though this portrayal will doubtless take more time and 
space, its economy may be even more impressive, our 
conclusion being that the character has infinite, inex-
haustible resources. SO 
Jarrett, J.L., op.cit. Page 220. 
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So to the extent that it is possible at all in fiction, 
finding out how characters feel is easier than it is in real 
life. There are clearly limitations, then, to the abilities 
literature may enable us to develop. The facts are not so 
readily available in real life, and we are not so clearly guided 
to the important facts. These are limitations, but what of the 
advantages of the nature of characterisation in literature? 
Although literature does not confront us with quite the 
same problem that we are confronted with in everyday life - the 
problem of deciding which bits of behaviour are relevant in our 
attempt to work out what another person feels - we are presented 
with examples of disposition- feeling- behaviour relationships 
from which irrelevant and distracting bits of information have 
been removed. Hence, although such examples will not provide 
instances which will make demands identical to those of "real 
life" situations, they permit an insight into the structure of 
beliefs, values and appraisals, and facilitate the establishment 
of analogies which would not otherwise be possible. Literature 
has the power to draw our attention to the details of a situa-
tion which, in real life, we would not otherwise have noticed . 
In novels this may be achieved through detailed description, 
but perhaps the best illustration comes from film- making where 
cameramen force us to attend to the slightest change in facial 
expression by zooming in so that the face fills the screen . 
Literature is an ideal material for this aspect of education, 
then, even if it will not do the complete job. 
There is very little that can be said here about the 
actual manner in which a teacher might proceed to develop the 
ability of pupils to reconstruct appraisals. Where the 
• I 
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literature permits it, it will be possible to use it to develop 
a number of aspects of appraisal - construction. From the 
evidence which can be found where beliefs and values are 
concerned, and from what are perceived to be the facts of the 
situation in which the emotion arises, the basic structure of 
the appraisal can be assembled. By employing the assumption 
of the coherence of appraisals, reasonable conjectures can be 
made respecting beliefs and values for which direct evidence is 
lacking. And the resultant reconstruction can be verified 
against the descriptions of the occurrent experience of the 
feeling . But the manner of proceeding will be determined by 
the nature of the literature, the maturity of the pupils and 
the requirements of the concept of "education " itself. 
This thesis has been an attempt to analyse what is 
involved in coming to know how other people feel (since this 
ability is necessary for a man to be able to act morally in many 
situations ) and to show what part literature can legitimately 
play in an educational programme intended to develop this 
ability. It has been made clear, however, that there are 
problems in any such use of literature in educational programmes, 
and that literary experience cannot reproduce some important 
elements of situations in which we confront people experiencing 
feelings. Other areas of enquiry have a considerable amount 
to offer educators who wish to develop this ability, and the 
possible contributions of these fields also calls for investi -
gation. An important one of these is social science, and 
another is history. Techniques in these disciplines permit us 
to analyse systems of beliefs and values and provide frameworks 
which will facilitate the reconstruction of appraisals. 
123 
Literary critics have long used such things as Freudian theory 
and the findings of historical investigations wherever these 
may help them to understand the emotional experiences of 
characters. Nevertheless, the philosophy of art deserves more 
attention from educational philosophers. There is a real 
urgency, not only to work out more carefully how children's 
literature should be criticised, but to look more closely at 
the ways in which literature might be taught. Analyses of the 
logic of criticism have only recently been able to break away 
from a preoccupation with what might be called "aestheticism" 
or matters of "taste"; a preoccupation which still predominates 
in the public view of art, and which confuses much of the 
treatment which art is given in schools. We must, through our 
educational philosophy, demonstrate in more detail how the 
experience of art serves to illuminate the "human condition". 
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